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Abstract
Recent turbulent times have once again demonstrated how important flexible product
and labour markets are to dampen the effects of adverse economic shocks. A number
of labour market reforms have been implemented to enhance economic resilience and
flexibility. However, accounting for the efficacy of policy interventions requires going
beyond national boundaries and evaluating international interactions and global inter-
dependencies, which may strengthen or weaken economic responses. Concentrating on
open European economies, this paper deals with labour market institutions and struc-
tural reforms in a general equilibrium framework, which allows to analyse the intricate
connections between labour policy choices and international trade (openness), paying
special attention to labour market policy shocks. Amid discussions about a fiscal union
in Europe, we empirically demonstrate that labour market policies can have positive
and negative spillovers to trading partners, thereby calling for coordinated policies
within a trading bloc. We answer three types of questions: what would have happened
had all economies implemented structural labour market reforms simultaneously? How
heterogeneous are responses in a single economy to shocks conducted in every other
country? Relatedly, how heterogeneous are responses by all economies to a reform in
one given economy?
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However fragmented the world, however intense the national rivalries, it is an inexorable
fact that we become more interdependent every day. (Jacques Yves Cousteau)
1 Introduction
Recent financial and European sovereign debt crises have intensified discussions on the need
to complement the European monetary union with the fiscal union. This paper analyses one
particular aspect of a real economy, namely responses to changes in structural labour market
reforms when economies are open and interdependent. Despite having a common body of
law, acquis communautaire, and being part of the Economic and Monetary Union (hence-
forth EMU),1 the European Union (henceforth EU) members possess substantial freedom
in fiscal decisions.2 We explore how structural labour market policies, set discretionary by
an individual country, affect not only the economy undergoing a reform, but also the entire
union. A counterfactual of a joint shock is implemented in the global vector autoregression
(henceforth GVAR) framework – we interpret its results as a counterfactual of joint labour
market decisions in all member states.
Varying levels of openness, fiscal policies, labour market institutions and economic struc-
ture all have an impact on the ways economies react to changes in labour market policies. The
old issue of high unemployment in Europe has spurred research on institutional conditions,
summarised by “Eurosclerosis” and understood as a combination of high unemployment, low
mobility and rigid labour markets. However, Europe remains far from homogenous, despite
common market and free labour mobility. Indeed, as evidenced by Bentolila et al. (2010), the
unemployment situation during the recent recession has differed significantly across coun-
tries. For example, French unemployment has hardly increased, while the unemployment in
neighbouring and institutionally similar Spain has skyrocketed.3 A model case is Germany
the success of which is usually ascribed to the so-called “Kurzarbeit” reduced working hours
programme and Hartz reforms.4 Yet a simple argument of more flexible labour markets
conceals much of the institutional contents of flexibility, especially in an ever interdependent
world. Indeed, in 2006-2007 the EU responded by putting forward the flexicurity approach5
1All European Union member states are part of the EMU. There is, however, the so-called third stage
of EMU when an economy adopts a common currency, the euro. All member states committed themselves
to join the euro zone eventually, apart from concessions for the United Kingdom and Denmark. We will,
therefore, sometimes refer to the EU as a monetary union without specifying the “stage” of EMU that our
analysed countries have reached (we thus do include the United Kingdom and Denmark to our empirical
exercise; in the Online Appendix we implement shocks with and without the United Kingdom).
2There are, of course, requirements when it comes to such measures as debt or deficit as stipulated, for
instance, in the Stability and Growth Pact, but there have been violations of requirements by a number of
countries. Each member is discretionary when it comes to regulating labour markets, and that is the focus
of our paper. We will use this discretion to explore how one country choice affects remaining members of
the union.
3Spanish experience has also been documented by Dolado and Stucchi (2008).
4See OECD (2010) for more details. Moeller (2010) argues that the specific type of German flexibility does
not stem from high labour turnover rates (hiring and firing), but through an unprecedented level of buffer
capacity within firms. Faia et al. (2012) confirm that unlike the standard demand stimuli, “Kurzarbeit”
policies yield large fiscal multipliers, as they stimulate job creation and employment. Another relevant
account can be found in Burda and Hunt (2011), also see Lastauskas and Tatsi (2013) for the spatial account
of Germany’s unemployment reaction to productivity shocks.
5Flexicurity is understood as “an integrated strategy involving active labour market policies, lifelong
learning, modern labour laws and social security systems, which facilitates transitions during the life cycle
and is conducive to job creation and social cohesion”, European Commission (2010).
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as the right policy “recipe”, inter alia, to counteract the segmentation of labour markets.6 In
short, it is the combination of labour market flexibility in a dynamic economy and security
for workers. However, acting within a monetary union necessitates to evaluate the effects
from changing labour market institutions at home to all other member states. In particular,
changes in the labour market are embedded in competitiveness and international prices, and
they can create or divert trade and even result in an undesirable result for the union as a
whole. As is duly summarised by Blanchard (2006), “it is one thing to say that labour mar-
ket institutions matter, and another to know exactly which ones and how.” Theoretically,
there is no consensus what response should be expected: a positive correlation between bad
labour market institutions at home and abroad is predicted by Felbermayr et al. (2013); to
the contrary, a country harms its trading partner by reducing its labour market frictions
in Helpman and Itskhoki (2010); Alessandria and Delacroix (2008), in turn, obtain that a
rigid economy increases a country’s welfare, whereas a flexible one suffers due to the terms
of trade effects. Therefore, it is of interest to quantify major labour market institutions in
a trading economy and their effects on macroeconomic performance while allowing for the
effects to act not only domestically, but also union-wide.
We find that an individual country’s change in its own labour market policies can trans-
mit to other members of the monetary union, sometimes featuring unintended consequences.
For instance, active labour market policies in Germany increases its employment and GDP,
but adversely affects the Greek economy; an increase in a tax wedge in Italy might help to
improve Spanish employment, whereas unemployment benefits in Ireland reduce employment
both domestically and inside the union (for instance, in Austria, France, the Netherlands).
Interestingly, the United Kingdom (UK), a country outside the euro zone, emerged as an eco-
nomy whose reaction to labour market reforms in other European economies has frequently
been negatively related to the effects in the reforming economy. This emphasises two points:
that British economy is quite distinct from the rest of Europe, and that a monetary union
helps to (at least to an extent) synchronise responses to fiscal policy shocks.
To the contrary, once a shock is implemented for all economies together – they all go
through a single fiscal decision, as would have been the case had a fiscal union existed – the
effect for all economies is way more comparable and mainly follows theoretical predictions.
In addition to being more homogenous, reaction is also quite often strengthened as compared
to the attempts to make a policy reform individually. We, therefore, interpret this result as
an argument in favour of a coordinated fiscal policy case, which dampens the spillover effects,
otherwise caused by the competitiveness and structural changes. It is important to stress,
however, that employment and GDP suffer from heterogeneity, but openness, for instance,
does not. Therefore, a policy implication, regarding a fiscal union, hinges on the choice of
macroeconomic variables that matter most.7
1.1 Questions and Brief Literature Review
Our main focus is on the transmission of policy effects and efficacy of labour market in-
stitutions in a trading world with interactions between goods and labour markets. More
precisely, we analyse the effect of labour market institutions on domestic macro variables,
6It has been over a decade that the EU attempts to tackle unemployment. The Luxembourg Extraordin-
ary European Council Meeting on Employment took place in 1997 and led to the European Employment
Strategy, which was incorporated into the broader Lisbon Strategy, designed to turn Europe into a more
competitive and dynamic economy, with more and better jobs. However, reality mismatches with the goals
quite miserably. Record high unemployment rates have been announced in 2013, reaching almost 27 per cent
for Spain, see Eurostat.
7It is important to note that we do not model other dimensions, which are important for drawing con-
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both from decisions made within the economy and shocks transmission, had all economies
been integrated into a synchronised unit. We also address the role of trade in spreading
labour market shocks and account for spatial interdependence. Historically labour literature
has been focusing on one country analysis conducted in a partial equilibrium – we, therefore,
have to introduce a dynamic, general equilibrium framework, which takes into account com-
mon technology, wage differences on both, trade patterns and domestic labour markets, and
their spillover effects.8 For this reason, we will draw from a number of literatures, including
international trade, labour with differing institutional details, and global macroeconometric
modelling.
Trade and unemployment have been analysed quite substantially, yet mainly on purely
theoretical grounds, employing a two-country (mainly symmetric) case.9 A closer to ours and
more policy-oriented approach has been offered by Felbermayr et al. (2013) which analyse
two-country Armingtonian trade model with frictions on the goods and labour markets in an
interdependent environment. Effectively, it is a combination of a heterogeneous firms trade
model of Melitz (2003) with the search and matching approach of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994). Felbermayr et al. (2013) map international spillovers of labour market institutions
across two asymmetric countries to estimating equations. Though the model is inherently
static, it is an important step towards multi-country analyses. We will deviate from them
both theoretically and empirically; unlike panel analysis, which assumes homogeneity in
responses of shocks across economies, we will allow for spatial heterogeneity. Moreover,
we will analyse dynamic responses, adding a possibility for cointegration within and across
economies. The inconsistency results of neglected heterogeneity in a panel framework has
been emphasised by Pesaran and Smith (1995).
As we plan to focus on the dynamic effects of labour market institutions for trading
economies, a dynamic extension of Helpman et al. (2010) with a richer labour market’s
setting, in particular, with a number of labour market policies, has been employed. We want
to learn about the labour market’s vigour and responses to different institutional measures,
namely financial incentives and activation schemes, and their transmission channels once
countries engage in international trade. Our dynamic extension features stochastic, rather
than deterministic, production functions in each economy. Due to a shared dynamic factor
(it can proxy for an economic and monetary union which aims at converging the economies
of all member states), economies are interlinked and susceptible to a global econometric
treatment. We draw from the literature on global macroeconomic modelling (see Pesaran et
al. (2004) and Garratt et al. (2006) for pioneering work in the area) with explicitly modelled
cross-sectional dependence. A natural vehicle for testing the question of intervention effects
on unemployment as one of the central impetuses is to use the global vector autoregressive
modelling framework.
We estimate country specific models for each European economy in the GVAR with the
main components of the structural model (trade, unemployment, terms of trade, intens-
clusions, such as labour migration and capital movements.
8There is, of course, literature beyond pure labour studies that accounts for macroeconomic effects. For
instance, macro-labour literature deals with real business cycles and labour market frictions as in, among
others, Cacciatore and Fiori (2014) which use the euro area at the aggregate level; Stähler and Thomas
(2012) work with a two-country model and fiscal policy simulations; Perotti (2005) deals with fiscal policy
for 5 OECD countries in the structural VAR setting. These are important contributions going beyond one
country setting – yet our value added is a consideration of a larger set of countries in one coherent framework
with heterogeneous rather than homogenous responses, and a union-wide counterfactual analysis.
9Recent contributions by Helpman et al. (2010); Helpman and Itskhoki (2010), Felbermayr et al. (2011a,b)
have shed new light on complex interactions between trade liberalisation, unemployment, and inequality.
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ive and extensive margins, and a set of labour market institutions) and examine how the
global system responds. A global econometric approach, afforded by the GVAR method-
ology, enables to deal with a stochastic dynamic economic system in a parsimonious way.
Interdependencies are then accounted through global factors, international co-movements
of business cycles, direct and indirect (through error terms) influences of the variables and
short-run feedback effects. Indeed, as has recently been demonstrated by Gnocchi et al.
(2015), business cycle fluctuations correlate with labour market institutions, and need to be
addressed jointly. Our framework can handle temporal variation and shed light on the role
of global linkages, an aspect largely missing in the macro-labour literature.
Next, we map our stochastic trade-labour setting, combined with the labour market
institutions, into an estimating system. Methodologically, we introduce weakly exogenous
variables – labour market policies – which are subject to shocks and are not determined from
within the economy, but can be freely set by policy makers.10 All other aggregate variables
are endogenous, as suggested by the theory, and are linked to other countries because of
trade. The theoretical and empirical setting revolves around three major questions. We first
ask what is the connection between different labour market institutions, and responsiveness
in openness, GDP, real exchange rate, and unemployment. Further, we conduct counter-
factual exercises on labour markets and long run effects on all economies when there is an
implementation of fiscal programmes by a single country. Moreover, a simultaneous imple-
mentation by all member states (a global shock) is interpreted as a counterfactual shock of
the European fiscal union, that is, what responses would have been observed had there been
a joint decision on labour market policies. Indeed, we find that fiscal policies embedded
in the labour market policies must be coordinated for them to be effective and achieve the
desired results – in other words, the global linkages cannot be addressed by local policy tools.
One externality concerns international dimension – changes in competitiveness affect trade
patterns which, in turn, influence not only international prices but also the entire linkages
among economies. Ignoring these channels might create unintended consequences for the
reforming country as well as for the entire monetary union.
Our plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we motivate our work drawing a
number of instances on how governments reacted to adverse shocks by changing labour
market institutions. We also report the major policies employed, their implementation in
different countries and explore the significance of spatial heterogeneity. Section 3 lays down
a simple version of a dynamic model featuring labour market institutions and exporting
opportunities. We introduce a common unobserved factor in production to link all economies,
in addition to international prices that account for imported goods. In other words, we
allow for technology interlinkages and multilateral terms, reflecting real exchange rates in
the European Union. All aggregate variables derived from the theory and their empirical
implications are covered in Section 4. We discuss an estimating system of equations and
major results in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes and specifies both, policy implications
and directions for further research. Appendices collect all supporting material; in addition,
there is an online document which reports all major results from the estimation of our
preferred empirical models.11
10One could in principle connect policy variables to endogenous variables through policy maker’s objective
function that depends on the system variable. However, we do not add this additional – government’s sector
– both to reduce complexity (as we also do not know the functional form of the objective function) and
because we are driven by observation that choices are more need based, far from smoothly changing with
the endogenous macro variables.
11All the codes and data are available upon request or from the authors’ websites.
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Figure 2.1: Unemployment rate dynamics in European countries (Germany’s
unemployment miracle)
2 Motivation
European unemployment has been scrutinised for years to understand its persistently high
level (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Blanchard, 2006). Recently, Bentolila et al. (2012)
analysed a situation when France and Spain, having similar labour market institutions (em-
ployment protection legislation (EPL), unemployment benefits, wage bargaining, etc) and
unemployment rates (around 8%) just before the Great Recession, subsequently experienced
substantially different outcomes with the around 10% unemployment in France and 23% in
Spain. Authors attributed the difference to de facto protection of temporary jobs between
two countries and differing labour (geographical) mobility (refer to Figure 2.1).
Introducing Germany into discussion requires additional arguments to explain unemploy-
ment patterns. Three neighbours, Spain, France, and Germany, diverged in unemployment
outcomes from the onset of the financial crisis. The success of Germany is commonly at-
tributed to the so-called Hartz reforms (Krebs and Scheffel, 2013). Note that they have
been introduced over the period 2003-2005, well before the crisis. As demonstrated in the
second graph of Figure 2.1, the unemployment benefits have been reduced substantially for
the long-term unemployed workers (refer to the black line showing the average benefits for
the unemployed in the second consecutive year). Therefore, institutional differences and
policy responses constitute major arguments.12 We thus also focus on discretionary policy
responses and explore their effects on macroeconomic variables. As noted by Boeri (2011a),
labour market institutions have been subjected to frequent policy changes and the largest
transformations have taken place in Europe. Our interest lies in policies, adopted during the
financial crisis, but this is not to imply that reforms are not implemented at other times.13
2.1 Fiscal Policies
Between 2008 and 2009, countries in Europe attempted a number of policy recipes to dampen
the negative effects of the financial crisis. In labour markets, many adopted wage subsidies,
12A more structural approach concerns compositional differences of labour markets. These include flexib-
ility of different segments of the labour force. Jahn et al. (2012) find that flexibility lowers attachment to
the firm which in turn may reduce workers’ incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital, which reduces
worker and firm productivity. We limit our analysis to the homogenous labour market as the comparable
data on compositional aspects across countries are largely lacking. However, our take can account for the
international dimension and a number of channels through which institutional changes spill over the borders
of national economies.
13In other words, frequent policy reforms can be thought of as discretionary, not functionally related to
some particular times, good or bad. Another dimension to timing is the method or policy contents; this
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Table 2.1: Types of wage subsidies
Countries
Wage subsidy type Targeted Untargeted
Social security contributions
reduced (temporary)
France, Romania,
Italy
Estonia, Latvia
Social security contributions
reduced (permanent)
Spain, Sweden Bulgaria, Czech
Republic,
Germany,
Hungary, Poland
Hiring subsidies United Kingdom
mainly through reductions in social security contributions, and often targeted at small en-
terprises or disadvantaged groups. As evidenced by a survey from the International Labour
Organisation (ILO), several European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hun-
gary, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey) decreased their social security contributions during
the crisis on a permanent basis. The nature of fiscal policies varied from country to country,
thus supporting the fact of discretionary policies and the absence of coordinated responses.
France, for instance, reduced employer social security contributions for firms with less than
ten employees hiring new low-wage workers in 2009.14 In Germany, there was a reduction
of employee and employer contributions to the unemployment insurance system. Spain re-
duced employer social contributions for the first two years of employment for unemployed
people with children who transit to full-time permanent contracts, and also implemented a
reduction in social security contributions for youth or disabled workers who start a business
as self-employed. A different approach was taken in the United Kingdom, where companies
received 2,500 pounds for hiring workers who were unemployed for more than six months.15
For eight countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Sweden,
and Turkey), the decrease in social security contributions was across the board, e.g., for all
employees or all newly hired employees. For eleven countries, the decrease was targeted to-
wards long-term jobseekers (Romania, Spain, Sweden, the), SMEs (France, Poland, Spain),
youth (Spain, Sweden), older workers (Italy, Spain). For Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Ger-
many, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, the decrease in social security contributions was both
permanent and untargeted. The summary is depicted in Table 2.1. There are also other
implemented policies, but since they are not addressed theoretically and empirically, we do
not report them here.16
2.2 Empirical Evidence of Labour Market Policies
Having reviewed the policy choices employed, we base our empirical motivation on several
major points. First, there is a fairly large amount of empirical evidence supporting that
is again discretionary and, as evidence demonstrates, many substantially different policy choices have been
made in European economies.
14The reduction was the largest for workers hired at the minimum wage and declined as the wage increased
up to 1.6 times the minimum wage.
15Across the board, hiring subsidies were set to be phased out in early 2011.
16However, see the non-publishable appendix, which collects more evidence on the other policy choice,
namely minimum wage. Other policy instruments, such as employment protection legislation, cannot be
employed for the empirical study due to temporal dimension and little variation, there are also theoretical
difficulties to capture all important aspects of protection, which are embedded in law.
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Source: Eurostat data
Figure 2.2: Expenditure on active labour market policies across the EU27
countries in 2010 (% of GDP)
labour market policies and institutions influence labour market outcomes. For example,
replacement rates generally have a positive effect on unemployment (Bassanini and Duval,
2006; Nickell et al., 2005). Increasing labour tax wedge, which is understood as the total
labour tax burden,17 increases unemployment (Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Orlandi, 2012).
In contrast, the estimated effect of expenditure on active labour market policies (hereafter
ALMP) is rather mixed. Orlandi (2012) finds that ALMP are effective in helping to re-
duce unemployment. However, Bassanini and Duval (2006) obtain statistically significant
estimates only for ALMP interacted with other variables,18 also state that expenditure on
some ALMP categories (such as training) is more effective than others. The heterogeneity
of these policy variables is visualised in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. Certain clusters emerge as,
absent spatial dependence, the colouring is expected to be purely random. Central Europe
is least keen in investing in ALMP whereas Scandinavia and the South are bigger spenders.
Unemployment benefits are more diverse: it seems that the North is less generous than the
South in terms of replacement payments.19
Second, we find that cross-country dependence is an important factor governing European
economies. Foreign trade is one of the potential shock transmission channels in the EU. To
better understand the effect of labour market policies and institutions on unemployment, we
17It is defined as income tax plus employee social security contributions (SSC) plus employer SSC (including
payroll taxes) less cash transfers related to income level and family characteristics, as a percentage of total
labour costs (defined as gross wages plus employer SSC).
18This raises a a question of the robustness of such a result, in particular how much of it is being generated
by a genuine ALMP variation.
19Refer to a recent study by Hagedorn et al. (2015) which uses policy discontinuity at the state borders
of the United States to control for endogeneity between unemployment and benefits and proves substantial
effect stemming from unemployment benefits to wages, vacancies, and employment.
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Source: van Vliet and Caminada (2012) data
Figure 2.3: Unemployment benefits across the EU27 in 2009
estimate the following baseline regression20
lnUnemploymentit = µi + α×OutputGapit + β × lnReplacementRateit
+γ × lnALMPit + δ × lnTaxWedgeit +Dt × TimeDummiest + θ ×Germany’s unificationt + εit.
(2.1)
In the spatial extension, we also include the so-called foreign variables, which are weighted
(using bilateral trade flows) cross-sectional averages of the unemployment and output gap.21
The results are reported in Table 2.2. We control for the output gap, fixed and time effects.
Both active labour market policies and tax wedge turn out to be statistically significant
policy variables. Traditionally, microeconometric studies have yielded mixed results on the
effect of active labour market policies on employment, refer to Card et al. (2015) for an
extensive meta analysis. In line with Felbermayr et al. (2013), we find that the domestic
unemployment rate is determined not only by domestic labour market variables, but also by
shocks in the trading partner countries. However, opposite expectations, foreign output gap,
proxying for foreign demand, does not have sufficient explanatory power. This is, however,
compatible with the findings in Felbermayr et al. (2013). We have also run a robustness
check with slight changes in variable definitions, and have obtained largely consistent results
(though the foreign output gap becomes statistically significant at 10% level, refer to the
online Appendix). Moreover, Appendix B collects evidence on the Moran I statistic (spatial
autocorrelation) once trade weights are used, therefore helping to establish that international
trade contributes to transmitting shocks across labour markets. However, unlike this quite
20Definitions of the variables used in the regression can be found in Appendix A.1.
21To be precise, Foreign ln uit is defined as
∑
j wij,t ln ujt and Foreign output gap is∑
j wij,t lnOutputGapjt. This definition is consistent with the GVAR framework where endogenous vari-
ables – here log of unemployment and output gap – are combined (weighted) into foreign variables. One
could in principle first weigh variables and later take log but that would have a different interpretation and
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Table 2.2: Panel regression of unemployment and policy variables
Dependent variable: ln uit Aspatial Panel Spatial Panel
Output gap -0.0467*** -0.0384***
(0.0127) (0.0107)
Foreign output gap -0.0800
(0.0827)
Foreign ln uit 1.0570**
(0.4480)
lnTaxWedgeit 0.3298*** 0.2693***
(0.0563) (0.0654)
lnALMPit -0.4317*** -0.4599***
(0.0606) (0.0612)
lnReplacementRateit 0.0513 0.0535
(0.0614) (0.0588)
R2 0.60 0.64
Note: 387 observations for 15 countries. Results with country fixed effects and time
fixed effects, ranging from 1985 to 2011. Constant included in both cases as is the
dummy for Germany’s unification. Robust standard errors in parentheses and p-
values in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
naïve approach, we want to use trade as the basis for connecting each economy, and allow
for heterogeneous responses to all variables. Before dealing with an empirical setup, we first
sketch a theoretical motivation.
3 Labour Market Institutions in a Trade Model
As is evidenced by Boeri (2011b), it seems there has been the so-called “sigma convergence”
in labour markets, i.e., a reduced cross-sectional variation in the level of labour market
indicators within Europe.22 Interestingly, European countries are also those that have im-
plemented the largest institutional transformations (the exception is taxes on low pay) over
the period 1985 – 2008.23 These ongoing reforms with somewhat converging labour market
institutional measures require a theoretical account where economies are interconnected and
can transmit their institutions to neighbouring and trading countries. We therefore sketch
a simple version of dynamic trade model with labour market frictions. We cover a basic en-
vironment with agents and firms, and the resulting equilibrium. We also discuss the major
channels through which labour market institutions operate in an open economy.
would not be consistent with the global system.
22Further, Boeri (2011b) claims that European labour market reforms are mainly partial ones, creating
long-lasting asymmetries in the enforcement of labour market institutions. A traditional approach is that
engineering two-tier reforms is generally a device for governments to win political obstacles to sizeable
regulatory changes. A theoretical account of dual or two-tier labour markets in the closed economy setting
is given in Saint-Paul (1996a,b, 1991).
23At least judging from the average rate of a change in the value of the labour market indicators over the
period.
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3.1 Agents and Preferences
This part follows Helpman et al. (2010) and its many components are therefore skipped. It
is worthwhile mentioning that there are two sectors, frictionless homogeneous and differen-
tiated (used for closing the model and pinning down the equilibrium wage), and risk neutral
homothetic preferences. The real consumption index for the sector (Qit) is defined as follows:
Qit =
[ˆ
ω∈J
qit (ω)β dω
] 1
β
, (3.1)
where ω indexes differentiated varieties, J is the set of varieties within the sector, qit (ω)
denotes consumption of variety ω, and β controls the elasticity of substitution between
varieties.
3.2 Firms and Technology
Given the specification of sectoral demand in (3.1), the equilibrium revenue of a firm, rit (ω),
is:
rit (ω) = pit (ω) qit (ω) = Aitqit (ω)β , (3.2)
where pit (ω) is a price of a brand ω, qit (ω) is the demanded quantity, Ait ≡ E1−βit P βit is
a demand-shifter for the sector, i.e., qit (ω) = (Ait/pit (ω))
1
1−β =
(
pit (ω) /P βit
) 1
β−1 Eit, and
Eit is the total expenditure on varieties within the differentiated sector while Pit is the
differentiated sector’s ideal price index. After a firm observes its productivity ϕ, which is
independently distributed and drawn from a Pareto distribution G (ϕ) = 1− (ϕmin/ϕ)z for
ϕ ≥ ϕmin > 0 and z > 1, the firm chooses to exit or enter the sector and whether to produce
solely domestically or for both the domestic and the export markets.
A firm incurs the production fixed cost, fd, as well as the fixed cost of exporting, fx,
both fd and fx being expressed in terms of units of the numeraire. Additionally, there is an
iceberg variable trade cost, τ > 1, measuring extra goods to be shipped for one unit to arrive
in the foreign market. Output of each variety (y) depends on the idiosyncratic productivity
of the firm (ϕ), the measure of workers hired (h), and the general (global economy-wide)
productivity (At):
yit(ϕ) = ϕhit (ϕ)Aλit , (3.3)
and λi is country i’s factor loading (access to the global technology, At). To pin down the
prices for any variety j, use the expression for qit (ω) to arrive at the inverse demand function
for a firm
pit (ω) = E1−βit P
β
itqit (ω)
−(1−β) .
Given technology, we know that
pit (ω) = rit(ω)qit(ω) = ϕ
β−1hβ−1it Aλi(β−1)t . (3.4)
Because of consumers’ love of variety and a fixed production cost, no firm will ever serve the
export market without also serving the domestic market. Variable Υit (ϕ) captures a firm’s
‘market access’, which depends on whether it chooses to serve both the domestic and foreign
markets or only the domestic market,
Υij,t (ϕ) ≡ 1 + Ix (ϕ) τ−
β
1−β
(
Ajt
Ait
) 1
1−β ≥ 1, (3.5)
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where Ix (ϕ) is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm exports and zero otherwise
(a generic Υx (ϕ) denotes ‘market access’ when Ix (ϕ) = 1).
Combining the production technology with equilibrium wage and hiring rates with rev-
enue function and market access equation in (3.5), the net profit maximisation problem can
be expressed as:
piit (ϕ) = max
hit ≥ 0
Ix ∈ {0, 1}

∑
j
1 + Ix,j (ϕ) τ− β1−β (Ajt
Ait
) 1
1−β
1−β Ait (ϕhtAλit )β − withit − fd − Ixfx
 .
(3.6)
Given that a large part of empirical literature finds evidence of selection into export markets,
where only the most productive firms export, we focus on values of trade costs for which
ϕx > ϕd > ϕmin. Despite our macroeconomic data, we cover firm heterogeneity to learn how
trade openness changes with labour market institutions, i.e., extensive margin exists only if
part of firms engage in trade.
3.3 Frictional Labour Market
We base this section using some notation from Boeri (2011b) and Hawkins and Acemoglu
(2014). The labour market is imperfectly competitive due to the existence of search fric-
tions.24 Consistently with much of the empirical literature estimating matching functions
(Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), it is assumed that matching occurs at constant returns
to scale:
xit (θit) =
(
uit
vit
)1−η
= θη−1it , 1 > η > 0, (3.7)
where the job finding (or the vacancy filling rate) depends uniquely on the ratio of the number
of vacancies, vit, to the number of unemployed, uit, that is, on the degree of labour market
tightness, θit ≡ vit/uit. Clearly, when η = 1, there is no weight attached to externality due
to unemployment, and matching is frictionless and perfect. Further, notice that v refers to
the aggregate (average) vacancy rate (as with heterogeneous firms, their vacancy rates are
potentially different).
For production to occur, a worker must be matched with a job. As in the seminal
contribution by Melitz (2003), firm’s productivity is subject to death shocks, occurring at a
(Poisson) frequency δ. In addition to a firm’s death, there is also a probability of separating
from employment relationship even if the firm keeps producing. We denote probability of
separation by s.
Gross flows in the labour market occur even when unemployment is constant. An increase
in unemployment comes from employed agents losing their jobs either due to exogenous sep-
arations s and/or firm-destruction shock δ, and decreases from successful matches, denoted
by mi. Indeed, equating a change to zero and solving for the steady state, one obtains
ui = 1− mi
δ + s =
δ + s
θixi (θi) + δ + s
= δ + s
θηi + δ + s
. (3.8)
This equation for unemployment is also known as the Beveridge curve. The key (endogenous)
variable determining the evolution of gross flows in the labour market is the (differentiated
24For an extension using firing taxes within a “two-tier” institutional framework, see Boeri (2011b) and
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sector’s) market tightness θi (affecting the job creation margin). Assuming frictionless ho-
mogeneous sector, the unemployment above refers to the national (aggregate) level.
3.3.1 Labour Market Institutions
We will consider two labour market policies that can affect equilibrium outcomes in the
economy. Namely, we analyse unemployment benefits as the proportion of the certain wage
in the homogenous sector, ωit, i.e., bit = %itωi, and an employment conditional incentive
eit. To be more precise, we consider an unemployment benefit such that bit/ωi = %it < 1,
which is offered as a replacement of earnings during an unemployment spell. For the sake
of simplicity, we employ a flat income replacement scheme providing jobless people with the
fraction 0 < %it < 1 of the homogenous sector’s labour income, ωi = 1, independently of the
past earnings history of the worker. The policy parameter %it, in particular, measures the
generosity of unemployment benefits. Benefits are assumed to be open-ended and provided
conditional on unemployment status. Notice that the government sector is not introduced, so
we implicitly assume that all the payments to cover these policies are financed from firms by
exogenously changing production taxes (there is a frictionless distribution of these payments
to the targeted agents e.g., unemployed, job searchers, etc.).
In the motivation part, our focus has also been on the active labour market policies,
framed as an employment conditional incentive, eit, which is provided to job-holders on a
flow basis as a measure to increase rewards from participation. This policy instrument can
be thought of as a wage subsidy. Traditionally, labour literature dealt with partial effects
of labour market institutions in isolation from the macroeconomy. A complete reform, on
the other hand, is bound to have effects on the labour market aggregates, i.e., a change in
any of the above policy parameters, %it and eit, may affect all potentially eligible groups,
that is, all the unemployed (%it) or all the employees (eit), and through price mechanism can
be transmitted to goods (or other) markets. Since the two covered institutions act as taxes
being borne by firms, we also analyse an empirical measure of a tax wedge, which introduces
a wedge in wages paid to employees and firm labour costs. We will explore how they affect
equilibrium wages, and, therefore, prices and aggregate variables. Moreover, we will have
an international dimension – a global factor and international trade connecting economies,
therefore, transmitting all the effects through international prices.
3.3.2 Wages
Obviously, the introduction of labour market institutions affects wages and prices which, in
turn, affect the entire macroeconomy. As our goal here is to derive solely a wage as a major
component that drives aggregate variables, we will skip all the details associated with a full
set of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations.25
Consistently with the current trade literature, wages are assumed to be paid by firms
to workers as the incremental surplus generated by their employment relationship following
arguments due to Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b). Suppose 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 of the surplus goes to a
firm, and 1 − κ to the employee. As the solution of HJB equations in an open economy is
lengthy, we sketch a derivation in the Online Appendix, and report the ultimate expression,
wit (hit; ϕ) = κ Γitϕ
β
γκβ+1−κh
γβ−1
it + (1− κ)
(
bit − eit + κ1−κθit
)
. (3.9)
Costain et al. (2010).
25Refer to Hawkins and Acemoglu (2014) for closed economy environment where HJB equations are set
out and solved.
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Just notice that the current expression involves the employment level hit, which is still an en-
dogenous object and varies with the firm productivity. The above equation shows that when
κ approaches 0, that is, workers have no bargaining power, wages collapse to the unemploy-
ment benefit net of the employment conditional incentive, which is indeed a measure aimed
at reducing disincentives to accept low-paid jobs. When, instead, κ approaches 1, wages in
(3.9) appropriate the entire match productivity and are augmented by the recruitment cost
net of the hiring subsidy and the discounted value of the firing tax (which is a lump-sum
payment). Under such conditions, however, it would be unprofitable to open up a vacancy
(the recruitment costs, net of the hiring subsidy, could not be covered by any ensuing flow
of net revenues at match formation). Hence, we need to impose that κ is strictly lower than
1. These insights lead to the first result.
Claim 1. Wages are increasing in the unemployment benefits and decreasing in the employment-
conditional incentive, holding firm’s employment constant. In particular,
∂wit(hit;ϕ)
∂bit
= 1− κ > 0,
∂wit(hit;ϕ)
∂eit
= − (1− κ) < 0,
The intuition for the Claim 1 is quite straightforward. The benefits increase the attract-
iveness of the outside option to opt for unemployment for the workers, thereby pushing the
employment compensation up. The increase in the wage subsidy reduces the wage related
costs. However, these effects still lack the channel from employment as it also changes with
labour market institutions. Therefore, substituting for the employment, wage rate becomes
wit (hit; ϕ) = wit = bit − eit + κ1−κ
(
θit + (r + δ + s) θ1−ηit
)
. (3.10)
The wage is identical across the firms, despite the productivity of the firm as vacancy posting
costs are linear. Wages are increasing in benefits bit, decreasing in employment-contingent
subsidies eit, and increasing in the labour market tightness θit, ceteris paribus. We do not
delve into developments in the labour market (i.e., do not cover how equilibrium tightness is
determined), but rather turn our attention to trade openness. It is affected by labour market
institutions through firm reallocations and changes in prices, arising from adjustments in
wages.
3.4 Equilibrium
The model is solved, as in Helpman et al. (2010), exploiting its recursive structure. After
determining labour market outcomes, the remaining endogenous objects include zero-profit
productivity cutoffs which determine aggregate variables – demand shifters Ait (and hence
expenditure Eit), dual price index Pit, the real consumption index Qit, the mass of firmsMit,
and the size of the labour force Lit. Since our emphasis is on aggregate implications, we will
skip the firm level structure (though refer to Appendix C.1 for more details).
The result that relates international trade and labour market institutions is summarised
as follows:
Lemma 1. The structure of active firms changes with labour market policies: share of
exporters increases with a rise in unemployment benefits and decreases with employment
contingent incentives, holding labour market tightness constant.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.1.
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The intuition for the results stated in the lemma is quite simple: since benefits are covered
by firms, that makes production costlier and thus increases the threshold productivity. The
subsidy works just in an opposite way – it can be thought of as an exogenous reduction in
the production costs. The change in labour market tightness causes a positive change in
the domestic productivity cutoff, denoted by ϕi,d. Hence, the results in Lemma 1 can be
extended to varying θi but then depend on the relative magnitudes of unemployment benefits
and subsidies, as will be covered in the following Section.26 In other words, the full, rather
than partial, effect admits both signs - this is consistent with heterogeneous impulse responses
that we cover in the empirical part of the paper. Interestingly, the impulse responses from a
counterfactual of joint changes in labour market regulation comply to the theoretical partial
effect.
3.4.1 Reallocations and Labour Market Policies
To understand the main mechanisms that will generate macro level results, shut off the
channel of the labour market tightness for a moment, and recall that cutoff productivities
are positively related to the unemployment benefits. This implies that paying larger benefits
hurts relatively inefficient firms more and makes survival more difficult. However, an opposite
effect is being brought, recalling that wages are constant across firms. An increase in benefits
causes a rise in wages, which must be counteracted by a drop in labour market tightness.
To see this, differentiate the equilibrium wage rate in (3.10) with respect to unemployment
benefit bit, thus arriving at
∂θit
∂bit
= − 1
κ
1−κ
(
1 + (r + δ + s) (1− η) θ−ηit
) .
This effect, which makes survival easier due to the less tight labour market, does not dominate
the direct effect of increased costs to cover benefits. Intuition is based on the standard
Melitz-type reallocations. Only instead of trade costs, we consider exogenous changes in
labour market regulation. Same as in Melitz (2003), the labour market plays a crucial role
as all the adjustments are through changes in relative prices. A decrease in the price index
has made sure that real wages have risen and driven the least productive firms away from the
market. Clearly, institutional measures in the labour markets affect prices which, in turn,
change welfare and all real aggregates in the economy.
A simple alternative way to see the results is to recall that the government sector is
not modelled; hence, policies are funded by active firms, and the reallocation is similar to
changes in production costs. To see this, consider the full effect on wages:
dwit
dΘit = 1 + κ (1− η)
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
θ−ηit
dθit
dΘit
= 1 + (1− η) (r + δ + s) θ−ηit > 0.
It is then clear that dp
β
β−1
it (ϕi,d)
dΘit =
β
β−1p
1
β−1
it (ϕi,d)
dpit(ϕi,d)
dΘit , therefore,
dpit(ϕi,d)
dΘit < 0 which leads
to dpit(ϕi,d)
dbit
< 0 and dpit(ϕi,d)
deit
> 0. Domestic prices rise with subsidies and decrease with
benefits – competition is fiercer once benefits are covered by firms, whereas subsidies are
an exogenous drop in production costs. These results rely on the wages being positive with
the sufficient condition (though not necessary) being bi > ei. It is of course an empirical
26It also depends on relative sizes of parameters β and κ.
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question whether benefits are larger than incentives, though at least this seems to be the
case on average (see Appendix A.3 for summary statistics). It is, therefore, of interest to
learn the heterogeneity of responses in real economies.
3.4.2 Aggregate Variables
We turn to briefly describing major aggregate variables which are observables and, therefore,
susceptible to empirical analysis. The free entry condition solves for the demand-shifter of
the sector Ait as a function of parameters, all the labour market institutions, fixed and sunk
costs, for given values of foreign demand shifter Ajt. The latter affects the solution only
through the intensive margin of trade, Υij,t. This solution can then be used to solve for the
price index Pit, recalling that z > β/ (1− β).
From equation (3.2) we know that qit (ϕ) = (Ait/pit (ϕ))
1
1−β . As a result the real con-
sumption index for the differentiated sector, Qit, equation (3.1) can be re-expressed as
Qit =
[ˆ
ω∈J
qit (ω)β dω
] 1
β
=
[ˆ
ω∈J
p
β
β−1
it (ω) dω
]β−1
β
1
β−1
A
1
1−β
it = P
1
β−1
it A
1
1−β
it , (3.11)
hence, we can solve for Qit as the function of the demand shifter and the ideal price index
Pit, i.e., Qit = A
1
1−β
it P
− 11−β
it . The price level Pit can be expressed as
Pit =
[ˆ
ω∈J
pit (ω)−
β
1−β dω
]− 1−β
β
(3.12)
=
Aλi β1−βt
(
βγ
κβ + 1− κ
) β
1−β
Mii
[
Θit +
(
r + δ + s
1− κ
)
θ1−ηit
] β
β−1
A
β
1−β
it V (ϕi,dt)
+
∑
j 6=i
A(λj−λi)
β
1−β
t τ
− β1−β
ji,t Mji
[
Θjt +
(
r + δ + s
1− κ
)
θ1−ηjt
] β
β−1
A
β
1−β
jt Υ
β
ji,t (ϕ) ρzij,tV (ϕji,t)
−
1−β
β
,
where V (ϕi,dt) ≡
´∞
ϕdt
ϕ
β
1−β dG(ϕ)
1−G(ϕdt) =
z(1−β)
z(1−β)−βϕ
β
1−β
i,dt and V (ϕji,t) =
z(1−β)
z(1−β)−βϕ
β
1−β
ji,t are defined
similarly to Helpman et al. (2008) to capture potentially zero trade flows, also z > β1−β
must hold for the integral of aggregates to be bounded. The probability of importing into
the domestic economy from abroad is ρzij,t ≡ 1−G(ϕji,t)1−G(ϕi,dt) =
(
ϕi,dt
ϕji,t
)z
, and is the measure of an
extensive margin of trade.
The change in the price index is related to the changes in labour market institutions,
aggregate (global) technology, intensive and extensive trade margins, and changes in firms’
reallocation between exporting and purely domestic sectors. Notice that a common un-
observed factor At is featured in the general price index. Therefore, co-trending implies
that factor loadings λ are all equal among themselves, i.e., limh→∞A(λj−λi)t+h is bounded to 1.
Clearly, the labour market institutions drive the general price index which also demonstrates
that effects from foreign countries can be “imported” through the goods market. The indir-
ect effect refers to threshold productivities. In other words, the very composition of domestic
producers and exporters react to changes in labour market policies (also refer to equations
(C.1) and (C.2) in the Appendix).
As mentioned, the price index is crucial for the welfare implications, also for understand-
ing reallocations of firms. The reduction in it implies, ceteris paribus, an increase in welfare,
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which can be caused by an increase in the shared common technology Aλit , decrease in trans-
port costs τt, and changes in labour market institutions, among others. The direct effect, Θit,
comes from the equilibrium employment, which reacts to labour market policies. Another
effect is embedded in V (ϕdt), and comes from firms reallocations domestically. Finally, the
international dimension is subsumed within the extensive margin ρt and the term V (ϕxt),
because they both would change through the exporting cutoff productivity, ϕxt.27
Accounting for general equilibrium and the international dimension is challenging – the
uncertainty about labour market tightness would be encountered again. The partial direct
effect through hiring reveals that
∂Pit
∂Θit
∣∣∣
else constant
∝
[
Θit +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
θ1−ηit
] β
β−1−1 , ∂Pit
∂Θjt
∣∣∣
else constant
∝
[
Θjt +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
θ1−ηjt
] β
β−1−1 .
Hence, an increase in benefits would increase the price index, ceteris paribus, whereas the
opposite would happen with an increase in the employment-conditional incentives. This is
in line with the previous results. Positive changes in benefits would relatively increase the
measure of domestic producers and their profitability, because prices would go up. This
makes real wages lower, and, thus, competition less fierce. Due to the free entry condition,
the exporters’ sector would suffer, as relatively fewer firms would be able to export. The
opposite would happen with an increase in employment incentives. The changes in foreign
countries labour market would be transmitted to the domestic economy through imported
varieties, and changes in their prices.
4 A Few Empirical Implications
We seek to operationalise our theoretical setting to a global dynamic econometric framework.
We first derive a few results regarding major macroeconomic variables.28 We then conduct a
number of comparative statics exercises which help to build intuition before turning to the
empirical results.
4.1 Real Exchange Rate
In order to understand how the major important international price, that is a real exchange
rate, behaves, we first briefly cover a simpler alternative to it, terms of trade. It focuses on the
intensive margin of trade, i.e., ToTij ≡ εijpj/pi where prices, due to isoelastic aggregators,
reflect the standard form of markups over marginal costs (here εij denotes the bilateral
nominal exchange rate, which is not modelled and treated as given). As it only includes
traded goods, a decrease in ToT leads to fewer exports being given up in exchange for a
given volume of imports. Since everything is denominated in terms of labour price (wage),
the exchange rate is just the relative price of foreign labour in terms of home labour units
(see Corsetti et al. (2007) for the analysis of trade margins and productivity spillovers).
27Previously, we thought of ϕxt as exporting rather than importing cutoff; however, in a steady state with
no trade imbalances, also in symmetrical countries, the two are mirrors of each other. Given differences in
economies, the cutoffs need not be the same, but the balancedness of trade would make sure that labour
market institutions bear implications for importers and exporters.
28We analyse the aggregate model at the global level though the theory is richer than that and can be
adapted to firm level or sectoral analysis. In particular, we seek to uncover an estimable macro model with
micro-foundations. We leave to empirically assess the micro level implications for future research.
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Formally,
ToTij,t ≡ εij,tpjt
pit
= εij,t
(
ϕi,x
ϕj,x
)1−β (
hit
hjt
)1−β
A(λj−λi)(β−1)t .
Therefore, co-trending makes sure the ToTij,t is stationary, as in that case the global effect is
eliminated. Evaluating the terms of trade at average prices (denoted by productivities with
a tilde), one obtains
ToTij,t (ϕ˜i,x, ϕ˜j,x) = εij,t
(
ϕ˜i,x
ϕ˜j,x
)1−β (
hit
hjt
)1−β A(λj−λi)(β−1)t
= εij,t
(
ϕ˜i,x
ϕ˜j,x
) (Υi,x
Υj,x
)1−β
Ait
Ajt
Θjt+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1jt
Θit+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1it
A−(λj−λi)t .
(4.1)
This leads to the following result.
Lemma 2. Terms of trade are stationary, provided outputs are co-trending, λj = λi for all
pairs i 6= j. A change in labour market policies is directly transmitted through prices and
indirectly through the exporters’ average productivity. Assuming no change in firms’ com-
position abroad after a change in home’s labour market institutions, one obtains that terms
of trade increase with employment contingent subsidies, e, and decrease with unemployment
benefits, b.
Proof. Differentiating (4.1) with respect to Θ yields the desired result,
∂ ˜ToT ij,t
∂Θit
Θit
˜ToT ij,t
= Θit
ϕ˜i,x
∂ϕ˜i,x
∂Θit − ΘitΘit+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1it < 0
∂ ˜ToT ij,t
∂Θit
∂Θ
∂b
< 0, ∂ ˜ToT ij,t
∂Θit
∂Θ
∂e
> 0.
Hence, higher exports are needed to cover the same volume of imports when there is an
increase in employment contingent subsidies, ei, and the opposite – lower exports – when
there is an increase in unemployment benefits. These results may be overturned for the
real exchange rate, since the extensive margin of trade is disregarded in the terms of trade.
The welfare-based real exchange rate, RERij,t ≡ εij,tPjt/Pit, compares price levels where
domestic producers are included, and whose increase can be interpreted as an increase in the
purchasing power of domestic residents. This leads to
RER
β
1−β
ij = ε
β
1−β
ij,t A
(λi−λj) β1−β
t
(
ϕi,d
ϕj,d
) β
1−β
×
Mii[Θit+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1it ]
β
β−1A
β
1−β
it +
∑
j 6=iA
(λj−λi) β1−β
t τ
− β1−β
ji Mji[Θjt+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1jt ]
β
β−1A
β
1−β
jt Υ
β
x(ϕ)
(
ϕi,d
ϕj,x
)z− β1−β
Mjj[Θjt+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1jt ]
β
β−1A
β
1−β
jt +
∑
` 6=j A
(λ`−λj) β1−β
t τ
− β1−β
`j
M`j[Θ`t+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1`t ]
β
β−1A
β
1−β
`t
Υβx(ϕ)
(
ϕj,d
ϕ`,x
)z− β1−β ,
and its stability is governed by diffusion of the common unobserved factor. Under co-
trending among all pairs of trading economies, the real exchange rate becomes stable. It
obviously depends on both intensive and extensive margins of trade. Hence, a change in
home labour market institutions (with no direct effect on foreign cutoff productivities) yields
an ambiguous result because a change in home prices might be altered by effects from foreign
countries. There are three major channels at work: the effect through domestic productivity,
which alters firm structure (non-exporters vs exporters), the direct effect on prices, and the
indirect effect on prices of exportables through the changed productivity level. It becomes
an empirical question, which force is dominating (refer to Appendix C.2 for theoretical
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results). Indeed, to see whether theoretical predictions manifest in data, we conduct shocks
in labour market policies and track how each economy’s real exchange rate reacts. We expect
substantial heterogeneity as each economy potentially differs in terms of the three channels
described above. Refer to Appendix D where Figure D.1 depicts reactions to changes in
active labour market policies, implemented separately by each economy. There is a tendency
for more and less open economies to cluster together.
4.2 Employment
Since we want to explore the evolution of employment (or unemployment), we use the equi-
librium condition of imperfect matching (refer to (3.8)), namely29
1− uit = Eit(κβ+1−κβ )(bit−eit+ κ1−κ θit+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1it )(δ+s)
= β
δ+s
Eit
E1−βit P
β
itA
λi
t Υ
1−β
it
= β
δ+sA−λit Υβ−1it
(
Eit
Pit
)β
.
(4.2)
Equation (4.2) captures the major forces embedded in the model: global dynamic factor (At),
intensive margin of trade Υit, real expenditure (aggregate quantity) (Eit/Pit), and primitive
parameters. To sign a change in employment, we shall consider two channels, the intensive
margin and the aggregate quantity (utility):
∂(1−uit)
∂eit
= β
δ+sA−λit Υβ−1it
(
Eit
Pit
)β [
(β − 1) Υ−1it ∂Υit∂eit + β
(
Eit
Pit
)−1 ∂(Eit/Pit)
∂eit
]
= (1− uit)
[
(β − 1) Υ−1it ∂Υit∂eit + β
(
Eit
Pit
)−1 ∂(Eit/Pit)
∂eit
]
> 0.
(4.3)
Using the steady state unemployment in (3.8) and labour market tightness in Section (3.4.1),
we can infer that ∂uit/∂eit < 0. This is useful for learning about the effect of labour market
policies (here, subsidies eit) on utility (Qit), i.e.,
∂ (Eit/Pit)
∂eit
>
(
β
1− β
)−1
Υ−1it
∂Υit
∂eit
Eit
Pit
. (4.4)
Since the right-hand side is negative, we assume that the effect on utility is either negative or
slightly positive (we will clarify the assumption in the following section). We are effectively
saying that the expenditure on active labour market policies, by reducing the costs to produce
and, therefore, average productivity, can result in a negative or a positive real expenditure,
as long as the effect is not too negative.
4.3 Multi-country Trade Flows
Further, we account for the global structure of the model by computing trade flows among
included countries. Recent contributions in gravity modelling have emphasised multilateral
29In principle, we could use the equation for equilibrium hiring, and combine it with the wage equation.
However, we do not have comparable data across countries for hiring rates at domestic producers or exporters.
Instead, we use the version of firm price (3.4), and apply the constant elasticity of substitution that comes
from monopolistic competition. That helps to get rid of productivity shock, and allows mapping the labour
market variables into aggregates. To be precise, pit (ϕ) = κβ+1−κβγ ϕ−1
[
bit−eit+ κ1−κ θit+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1it
AtAλit Υit(ϕ)1−β
]
= witβϕ =
1
βϕ , therefore, yielding bit − eit + κ1−κθit +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
x−1it = 1κβ+1−κE
1−β
it P
β
itAλit Υ1−βit .
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resistance terms – or general equilibrium results embedded in the trade model even consid-
ering bilateral trade flows (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). The gravity model has
further been augmented to account for a firm heterogeneity and the resulting firm selection
in Helpman et al. (2008).
We proceed by using prices in (3.4) and demand as summarised in the revenue function
(3.2) to obtain total exports from country i (a sum of bilateral flows),
EXit ≡ ∑j 6=i ´∞ϕij,x rij,t (ω) dG(ϕ)1−G(ϕij,x) = ∑j 6=i ´∞ϕij,x ϕβhβitAλiβt dG(ϕ)1−G(ϕij,x)
= ∑j 6=i τ
β
β−1
ij A
λi
β
1−β
t
P
β
β−1
jt
(
βγAit
κβ+1−κ
) β
1−β
[
Θit +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
x−1it
] β
β−1 EjtΥβij,xV (ϕj,x)
= z(1−β)
z(1−β)−β
∑
j 6=i
(
τijpjt(ϕij,x)
Pjt
) β
β−1 Ejt.
(4.5)
It is certainly a function of price indices at home and abroad (real exchange rate), bilateral
trade costs τ that a country i needs to cover when trading with all countries j, GDP in all
trading partners,30 and the labour market policies, which enter through the cutoff productiv-
ity level ϕij,x, and determine how competitive an economy is in the world market. Hence,
an aggregate gravity-type relationship entails variables, which are all endogenous, and must
be modelled simultaneously.
To determine the openness ratio, we express exports in (4.5) as
EXit/Eit = z(1−β)z(1−β)−β
(
βγ
κβ+1−κ
) β
1−β
[
Θit +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
x−1it
] β
β−1 (Eit/Pit)β−1 P
β
1−β
it Πit
= z(1−β)
z(1−β)−ββ
β
1−βΥ−βit A
λi
β
β−1
t (Eit/Pit)−1 Πit,
(4.6)
where Πit is an endogenous multilateral resistance term, defined as
Πit ≡
∑
j 6=i
(
τij,t/ϕijt,x
Pjt
) β
β−1
(
Pit
Pjt
)(
Ejt
Pjt
)
Υβijt,x. (4.7)
This term affects all trading economies, and is time varying. It can be thought of as a
weighted average of major endogenous variables, including the real exchange rate (the ratio
of price indices), real GDP, trade costs, and trade margins.
An empirical implication is that, if aggregate variables do not change, the effect on
openness, EXit/Eit, acts through the intensive margin Υit, see equation (4.6). The effect
of a change in structural labour markets would differ, depending on the general equilibrium
term Πit, which is a function of macro variables in all trading partners. Consider a partial
change in labour market subsidies (ALMP):
∂ (EXit/Eit)
∂eit
∝ −βΥ−β−1it
∂Υit
∂eit
> 0. (4.8)
The sign follows from the free entry condition that relates intensive and extensive margins
of trade.31 Keeping fixed costs exogenous, an increase in expenditure eit reduces the average
firms’ productivity (it becomes easier to produce). Recall Lemma (1) on the structural
30To be precise, Eit refers to the differentiated sector’s expenditure, not the entire economy which shall
also include the homogenous sector. However, the latter is always fixed by the population since its wage is
normalised to one.
31Divide cutoff productivities, as described in the Appendix; also refer to the equation (C.3).
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changes in an economy. Due to a drop in the domestic productivity cutoff, extensive margin
drops (ϕx/ϕd increases), and, to keep the fixed costs unchanged, there should be a drop in
Υit. It then follows that the openness increases, keeping other aggregate variables constant.
A change in the aggregate quantity, Eit/Pit ≡ Qit, can alter the above prediction. We
therefore need to apply an expression in equation (3.11), and evaluate
∂(EXit/Eit)
∂eit
∣∣∣
Πit fixed
= − (EXit/Eit)
[
βΥ−1it (∂Υit/∂eit)− (Eit/Pit)−1 ∂(Eit/Pit)∂eit
]
> 0. (4.9)
The sign depends one the partial effect of Eit/Pit in the equation (4.4). The derivative is
positive, provided that the partial effect in (4.4) is negative. Indeed, even if it was slightly
positive, i.e., ∂ (Eit/Pit) /∂eit > 0, there exists a range of parameters that yield a positive
effect. Finally, there is a third channel, which is even harder to evaluate theoretically –
international spillover effects are embedded in Πit. We let data speak as to whether they are
strong enough to change the predictions on openness.
To finalise, substitution of employment into the aggregate gravity relationship, yields an
estimating equation
EXit/Eit =
z (1− β)
z (1− β)− β (δ + s)
β
1−β (1− uit)
β
1−β (Eit/Pit)β(
β
β−1)−1 Πit. (4.10)
The statistical modelling of the openness dimension clearly depends on the assumptions
about Πit. We discuss two solutions to deal with it.
4.4 Estimating Specifications
What regards the general equilibrium term Πit, we concentrate on two ways to address it
empirically, namely using a proxy and linearising it around β = 0 (in Appendix D, we also
report a few other modelling alternatives).32
4.4.1 Model I: Real Effective Exchange Rate
Our first solution is to observe that (4.7) can be written as Πit =
∑
j 6=i$ij,t
(
Pit
Pjt
)
, where
the weight $ij,t on the relative prices accounts for trade openness, market access, and real
GDP. This yields a weighted sum of exchange rates – any such average we call a real effective
exchange rate, reer. As we cannot empirically uncover the weight, we assume it is multi-
plicatively separable, so that Πit = F λit
∑
j 6=i$j
(
Pit
Pjt
)
= F λit × reerit where F λit is rooted in
a global technology At, inherent in income definition, and modelled as a dynamic factor.
Using such a specification, the estimating relationship becomes
ln
(
EXit
Eit
)
= β˜i + β1−β ln (1− uit) +
(
β
(
β
β−1
)
− 1
)
ln
(
Eit
Pit
)
+λi ln
(
EXit
Eit
)? − λi β1−β ln (1− uit)? − λi (β ( ββ−1)− 1) ln (EitPit )? − λi ln reer?it + ln reerit.
Econometrically, we introduce openness, employment, real GDP, real exchange rates, and
their cross-sectional averages.33 Note that labour market institutions, chosen discretionarily
by policy makers, affect all these variables.
32In Appendix D we report a possibility to use a global unobserved factor, and the fourth variant, where
we deal with unemployment rather than employment, a more traditional but less theoretically motivated
specification.
33The cross-sectional averages are defined as ln (EXit/Eit)? =
∑
ωi ln(EXit/Eit)∑
ωiγi
, ln (1− uit)? =
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4.4.2 Model II: Linearisation (no global technology)
We linearise the multilateral term around β = 0, thus treating the term as a function of
elasticity of substitution, namely f (β) = ln Πit.34 Some calculus yields
ln Πit = ln reerit + β
∑
j 6=i
rerji,t
reerit
ln Υijt,x − (β − 1)∑j 6=i rerji,treerit ln (EXij,tEjt ) ,
which, combined with the linearisation of the main part, gives
ln
(
EXit
Eit
)
= ln
(
Eit
Pit
)−1
+ β ln (1− uit) + ln reerit
+β∑j 6=i rerji,treerit ln Υijt,x − (β − 1)∑j 6=i rerji,treerit ln (EXij,tEjt ) .
Since the unobservable market access can be mapped to observables, we finally obtain
ln reerit = β1−β ln
(
β
δ+s
)∑
j 6=i
rerji,t
reerit
+
[
ln
(
Eit
Pit
)−1 − β
β−1
∑
j 6=i
rerji,t
reerit
ln
(
Ejt
Pjt
)β]
+
[
ln (1− uit)β − 11−β
∑
j 6=i
rerji,t
reerit
ln (1− ujt)β
]
−
[
ln
(
EXit
Eit
)
− (1− β)∑j 6=i rerji,treerit ln (EXij,tEjt )] .
This is somewhat similar to the previous specifications, only with the weighting being driven
by changes in international prices, rather than a bilateral trade.
Note that all aggregate variables are functions of a cutoff productivity (see (3.12) for
prices, (4.2) for employment, and (4.5) for openness). Productivities are, in turn, determined
by labour market institutions (see equations (C.1) and (C.2) in the Appendix). We discuss
the econometric framework, which incorporates endogeneity of aggregate variables and the
exogeneity of labour market policies, together with the international dimension, in a single
framework.
5 Econometric Framework and Results
Our model accounts for two international aspects – firm reallocations and price changes. The
two are related through endogenous firm restructuring, and react because of both domestic
and international policy changes. Due to the general equilibrium structure of the model,
we will treat all variables, except for policy and cross-sectional ones, as endogenous. Policy
variables are determined outside the model, whereas cross-sectional averages are weakly
exogenous with respect to the parameters of interest.
The idea to use cross-sectional averages to model a global economy is to be found in
Pesaran et al. (2004), Pesaran (2006) and Dees et al. (2007), which produced a coher-
ent framework to model global economic linkages (this strategy has roots in Mundlak-
Chamberlain projections to relax random effects in panel data models). Provided that the
global system is constructed so that the chosen weights are “granular” in the sense of Chudik
and Pesaran (2011),35 then the constructed global (or foreign) variables are weakly exogen-
ln
∑
ωi(1−uit)∑
ωiγi
, ln (Eit/Pit)? =
∑
ωi ln(Eit/Pit)∑
ωiγi
, and ln reer?it =
∑
ωi ln reerit∑
ωiγi
. See Appendix C.3 for full details
and a discussion of other more constraining specifications.
34Behrens et al. (2012) based their econometric specification of gravity on similar linearisation. Notice that
the use of elasticity of substitution 1/ (1− β) = 1 as a benchmark was already applied by Kmenta (1967).
35Effectively, Chudik and Pesaran (2011) state that the weight matrices W in are such that W in =(
ω1in, . . . , ω
k
in
)′ with ωii = 0 and ∑Nn=0 ωin = 1 and that “granularity” conditions are as follows: ‖W ‖ =
O
(
N−
1
2
)
, ωk ‖W ‖−1 = O
(
N−
1
2
)
for all k, and limN→∞ V ar (Wxt) = 0 for all t. Then, it is said that xit is
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ous. To be concrete, let the weights be defined as
ωij,t = IMji,t+EXij,t∑
j 6=i IMji,t+
∑
j 6=i EXij,t
, Model I,
ωij,t = rerji,treerit , Model II,
and be constructed from the flows data for imports (IM) and exports (EX) whereas rer and
reer are real exchange and real effective exchange rates, constructed from the unit labour
cost data. Following our discussion in Section 2.2 (as well as evidence in Appendix B), trade
seems to be an important channel to transmit labour market institutions (standard weights
capture trade directly, whereas Model II captures competitiveness effects embodied in prices
and has not yet been used in the literature).
As mentioned, the effects of labour market policies domestically, as well as globally, were
evaluated using the GVAR methodology. We extended the GVAR framework where all vari-
ables are treated endogenously to accommodate exogenous labour market policy variables.
We consider labour market policy variables being set independently and discretionary by a
policy maker in each economy, that is, we rule out a mechanical mapping from an economy
into the policy reaction.36 Our choice also conveniently allows to obtain structural exogenous
shocks, instead of calculating generalised impulse responses as it is common in the GVAR
literature (see Online Appendix for a technical discussion).
The GVAR model, which we use for the empirical labour market policy evaluation, con-
sists of country specific VARX (VAR with weakly exogenous variables) models, which in the
vector error correction model, VECMX, form can be written as
∆xit = ci0 +αiβ′i(zi,t−1 − γi(t− 1)) + Λi0∆(x?it,y′it)′ + Φi(L)∆zi,t−1 + ui,t, (5.1)
where xit = (rgdpit, 1 − uit, openit, rerit)′ is a vector of the country’s endogenous variables
(real gross domestic product, unemployment rate, trade openness, real effective exchange
rate), y∗i,t corresponds to foreign counterparts of the endogenous variables (constructed by
taking trade weighted averages), yit = (almpit, twit, benefitsit)′ is a vector of country’s
labour market variables (expenditure on active labour market policies, tax wedge, unem-
ployment replacement rate), zit = (x′it, x?′it , y′it)′, Λi0 and Φi(L) are parameter matrices of
short run adjustments with lag structure L, αi is a ki × ri matrix of rank ri and βi is a
(ki + k∗i + kx,i)× ri matrix of rank ri, i = 1...15 (all euro area OECD countries).37
The cross-sectional means x?it are defined as weighted averages in terms of pre-determined
weight matrices Wij,t of order k?i × kj at time t given by
x?it
(
W i,τ(t)
)
=
N∑
j=0
W ij,τ(t)xjt =W i,τ(t)xt, (5.2)
where xt = (x′0t, x′1t, . . . , x′Nt)
′ is a k×1 vector of the endogenous variables (k = ∑Ni=0 ki), and
W it = (W i0,t, W i1,t, . . . , W iN,t). When the same set of weights is used across all variables
the covariance stationary process which is also cross-sectionally weakly dependent. This makes sure that the
“idiosyncratic” shocks of the individual country models should be cross-sectionally “weakly correlated”, so
that E (Wxt,εt)→ 0, with N →∞, and, as a result, the weak exogeneity of the foreign variables is ensured.
36This could be an interesting extension to compare our results with an endogenously set policy. However,
it would require another block for the policy maker in our model and further assumptions about her objective
function. We thus leave it for future research.
37The specification and estimation of the model was based on GVAR Toolbox 2.0 (Smith and Galesi). The
lag order and number cointegrating relations in country specific models were initially selected according to
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in a given economy, then the k?i rows ofW i,τ(t) will be identical, except for possible differences
in scaling.38 It is important that for each choice of the weights,W i,τ(t), x?it
(
W i,τ(t)
)
and its
lagged value are constructed according to (5.2), and it is not necessarily the case that x?it−1
is equal to the lagged value of x?it. This is the case only if the weights are fixed across all
time periods.39
Notice that labour market policy variables enter the cointegrating relations as well, thus,
they can potentially have an effect on long-term developments. This is because the adjust-
ment in the model takes place through firm reallocation, as in Melitz (2003). The cutoff
productivity levels (see equations (C.1) and (C.2) in the Appendix) depend on the labour
market policies (through average revenues per employee), and thereby affect all the aggregate
variables through the general equilibrium (price) effects.
We examine the effect of labour market policy variables by increasing one of the variables
in a specific country by 1% and keeping it higher for the whole forecasting horizon (40
quarters). We measure the impact by comparing the outcome of endogenous variables in
the case of the shock and the baseline scenario (a case without the policy change). As we
are mainly interested in the effect of labour market policies on unemployment, we mostly
focus on developments in the labour market. The subsequent impulse response functions,
depict median outcome estimates of 10000 bootstrap replications together with their 90%
confidence intervals. We report results from the first and second solutions of the multilateral
term discussed above, and refer the reader to Appendix D for the third model, and an
extension where unemployment is used instead of employment.
5.1 Empirical Results
Due to the global nature of the exercise, we cover a subset of results, which illustrate theor-
etical implications and prove the existence of spillover effects (for data coverage and descrip-
tions, see Appendix A; results for a full set of countries are produced in the Online Appendix).
First, we demonstrate that labour market policies affect domestic employment as suggested
by the theory. We pick Portugal, Italy, and Ireland for illustration. Among them, spillover
effects are more evident for labour market policies in Portugal and unemployment benefits
in Ireland. There is some evidence of geographical proximity, and economic linkages playing
a role for the strength of a spillover. Next, we analyse how a response would have changed
had there been a fiscal union in place. To strengthen our argument, we gather individual
reactions and exemplify a large heterogeneity of responses in all economies to reforms in
one country; we also cover responses in one selected economy to reforms in all the member
states (though shocks are conducted separately in each country). Note that, unless stated
otherwise, the reported results are produced by Model I, which is our benchmark model.
Before delving into a few country-specific results, we overview the distribution of em-
ployment, GDP, openness and real effective exchange rate sign responses to positive shocks
on expenditure for active labour market policies (Table 5.1), unemployment benefits (Table
the Akaike criteria and Johansen’s rank test respectively. However, for several countries the cointegrating
rank found by Johansen’s test had to be reduced to obtain a stable GVAR model.
38For instance, three year moving average trade weights could be used with the weights re-set at the start
of each year and kept fixed through a given year, which can be specified in terms of τ (t). If a fixed set of
weights are used over time then τ (t) will be fixed and will not change with t.
39To see this, rewrite 4x?it = x?it − x?it−1 = W i,τ(t)xt −W i,τ(t−1)xt−1. The change in foreign variables
could be caused by a change in domestic variables and/or the change in trade weights. For the technical
details, we refer to the Online Appendix, and the textbook treatment in Garratt et al. (2006).
24
Table 5.1: Distribution of the signs of impulse responses after one period to a
positive shock on expenditure for active labour market policies
Source of ΔEmployment ΔGDP ΔOpenness ΔREER
a shock + - + - + - + -
Austria 11 4 1 14 3 12 13 2
Belgium 6 9 0 15 1 14 11 4
Denmark 5 10 15 0 5 10 14 1
Finland 2 13 0 15 1 14 13 2
France 4 11 7 8 0 15 14 1
Germany 13 2 14 1 15 0 1 14
Greece 13 2 1 14 3 12 13 2
Ireland 0 15 0 15 0 15 1 14
Italy 13 2 15 0 3 12 15 0
Luxembourg 1 14 0 15 2 13 1 14
Netherlands 14 1 15 0 10 5 15 0
Portugal 15 0 15 0 13 2 15 0
Spain 14 1 12 3 14 1 2 13
Sweden 0 15 2 13 0 15 13 2
United Kingdom 0 15 0 15 8 7 0 15
Note: the first column of the table indicates a country in which shock is observed. We count the cases when
the shock induced positive/negative changes in one of the variables in 15 analysed countries 1 quarter after
the shock.
Table 5.2: Distribution of the signs of impulse responses after one period to a
positive shock on unemployment benefits
Source of ΔEmployment ΔGDP ΔOpenness ΔREER
a shock + - + - + - + -
Austria 1 14 3 12 5 10 1 14
Belgium 6 9 15 0 13 2 5 10
Denmark 15 0 14 1 14 1 14 1
Finland 0 15 0 15 3 12 0 15
France 2 13 0 15 4 11 1 14
Germany 15 0 15 0 13 2 15 0
Greece 0 15 0 15 2 13 1 14
Ireland 13 2 3 12 2 13 14 1
Italy 4 11 0 15 5 10 3 12
Luxembourg - - - - - - - -
Netherlands 0 15 0 15 2 13 0 15
Portugal 15 0 15 0 14 1 4 11
Spain 11 4 14 1 14 1 3 12
Sweden 1 14 14 1 7 8 4 11
United Kingdom 0 15 0 15 4 11 0 15
Note: the first column of the table indicates a country in which shock is observed. We count the cases when
the shock induced positive/negative changes in one of the variables in 15 analysed countries 1 quarter after
the shock.
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Table 5.3: Distribution of the signs of impulse responses after one period to a
positive shock on labour tax wedge
Source of ΔEmployment ΔGDP ΔOpenness ΔREER
a shock + - + - + - + -
Austria 4 11 14 1 12 3 3 12
Belgium 0 15 13 2 8 7 3 12
Denmark 10 5 15 0 14 1 4 11
Finland 0 15 0 15 2 13 8 7
France 15 0 15 0 13 2 4 11
Germany 15 0 15 0 14 1 7 8
Greece 4 11 0 15 2 13 8 7
Ireland 14 1 1 14 4 11 13 2
Italy 2 13 13 2 13 2 1 14
Luxembourg 5 10 13 2 13 2 1 14
Netherlands 14 1 15 0 13 2 15 0
Portugal 14 1 15 0 13 2 15 0
Spain 0 15 3 12 0 15 13 2
Sweden 11 4 15 0 8 7 14 1
United Kingdom 0 15 0 15 0 15 0 15
Note: the first column of the table indicates a country in which shock is observed. We count the cases when
the shock induced positive/negative changes in one of the variables in 15 analysed countries 1 quarter after
the shock.
Table 5.4: Distribution of the signs of a positive regional shock after one period
to one of the labour market policy variables
Shock to
ΔEmployment ΔGDP ΔOpenness ΔREER
+ - + - + - + -
Expenditure on ALMP 7 8 5 10 2 13 14 1
Unemployment Benefits 9 6 12 3 14 1 2 13
Labour Tax Wedge 5 10 14 1 14 1 3 12
Note: we count the cases when the shock induced positive/negative changes in one of the variables in 15 analysed
countries 1 quarter after the shock.
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Figure 5.1: Change in the employment rate in various countries due to the
increase in expenditure on active labour market policies in Portugal
5.2), and labour tax wedge (Table 5.3).40 The heterogeneity is quite staggering: a posit-
ive shock of a labour market policy in one economy can be associated with both positive
and negative responses in other EU member states. One exception, however, is the United
Kingdom. Shocks that originate in the UK are mainly related to the reactions of the same
sign in all remaining economies. To learn the effects once we implement a joint change in all
member states, we track the counterfactuals as if the fiscal union existed. As is reported in
Table 5.4, though heterogeneity is still observable for the one period responses, the increase
in spending on active labour market policies yields a drop in openness and an increase in
REER, with a clear opposite result if benefits were increased. The changes in tax wedge are
associated with very homogeneous responses even after the first period.
Turning to a few specific examples, we first describe results on the employment. The
theory hints that employment shall increase with subsidies and decrease with benefits, once
spillover effects are ignored (refer to the equation (4.3)). Firstly, we study the increase of
expenditure on active labour market policies in Portugal. As can be seen in Figure 5.1 for the
benchmark Model I, the increase of labour market policy spending in Portugal, statistically
significantly increases its domestic employment rate. The result is expected, but what is
more interesting is that we can see the effect spilling over to neighbouring Spain and, to a
smaller extent, even to Germany. On the other hand, the effect on employment in United
Kingdom is mostly unaffected (or might even have a negative effect) due to weaker economic
relations between the countries. Using a very different weighting scheme in Model II, all the
effects remain comparable (it is worthwhile mentioning, the effect on UK becomes positive
though insignificant), thus making results robust to the choice of weights.41
We further investigate the impact of changes in labour market environment considering
the increase of the tax wedge in Italy. Although we see some interesting reverse movements
in Spain’s employment rate in Figure 5.2, among the countries analysed, Italy is the only
40The signs are collected from one period responses; however, we also conduct a similar exercise and track
signs after 10 periods. We report the results in the Online Appendix.
41Indeed, Chudik and Pesaran (2011) show that granular weights are of secondary importance asymptotic-
ally; yet, in finite samples, results are usually quite sensible to the choice of weighting scheme, so our results
are quite reassuring. Though it is worthwhile mentioning that using the real exchange rate, instead of trade
weights, yields more comparable impulse responses among themselves as the country size effect is barely ac-
counted for (though larger countries tend to have somewhat lower price indices due to a larger basket of
importables).
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Figure 5.2: Change in the employment rate in various countries due to the
increase in the tax wedge in Italy
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Figure 5.3: Change in employment rate in various countries due the increase in
unemployment benefits in Ireland
one with statistically significant differences in employment due to the shock. In this case,
spillovers between the countries were not as considerable, compared to the previous scenario
– the obvious explanation being that the change in the labour market policy variable did
not result in such a strong initial domestic response as in the previous case. Using Model II
and real exchange rates as weights, the effect on Italy remains intact, and other spillovers
are even less significant.
In the motivational part of our paper (Section 2), using panel regression, we have es-
timated the unemployment replacement rate, on average, to have a statistically insignificant
effect on the unemployment rate. Naturally, such a result does not preclude unemployment
benefits to be an important factor governing unemployment rate in some of the countries.
Figure 5.3 shows that in Ireland, an increase in unemployment benefits not only statistic-
ally significantly reduces domestic employment, but has spillover effects to other European
countries as well. Model II confirms the directions of impulse responses, and makes them
even more profound and significant.
We also explore the finding about the shocks associated with the UK. As was clear
from the Tables 5.1-5.3 on signs distribution, the rest of the EU reacts very similarly to
changes in British economy. It is, therefore, of interest to see how UK reacts to policy
reforms in one selected European economy. In Figure 5.4 we track how the UK responds
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Figure 5.4: Finnish and UK responses of the employment rate to policy shocks
originating in Finland
to the Finnish labour market reforms. It is clear that the reactions of two economies are
substantially asynchronous: what makes Finland increase its employment leads to a drop in
British employment. This emphasises two points: that the British economy is quite distinct
from the rest of Europe, and builds a further argument for the investigation of what would
have happened if the EU conducted a single policy change.
We thus now turn to using our model for a regional counterfactual analysis and continue
exploring heterogeneity of individual country responses. We cover three types of questions:
what would have happened had all economies implemented structural labour market reforms
simultaneously (as compared to a case of an individual economy undergoing reforms)?42 Fur-
ther, we seek to answer the following: how heterogeneous are responses in a single economy
to shocks conducted in every other country? Relatedly, how heterogeneous are responses by
all economies to a reform in one given economy?
5.2 Counterfactual of a Fiscal Union
We have already witnessed that a labour market policy shock in one country can have a
substantial spillover effect to other countries as well. This rather straightforward result
leads one to wonder if coordinated measures of all monetary union countries would be more
successful in tackling some of the European labour market issues.
We define a regional labour market policy shock as a contemporaneous and lasting in-
crease in labour market policy variable in all of the countries (this translates to performing
one of the previous subsection’s scenarios in all of the countries at once). We have per-
42As a topical extension we also consider a fiscal union of all European economies but the United Kingdom
(UK). Not only discussions about a potential British movement away from the EU, but also empirical evidence
in Tables 5.1-5.3 constitute a reason to explore how the European economy evolved under two different
scenarios. We thus compare two cases: with and without the UK undergoing labour market reforms (in both
of them, all other economies are implementing the reforms). The difference in responses, with and without
the UK, is always negative for the tax wedge and unemployment benefits, indicating that employment tends
to react more negatively, with the UK being a part of the regional shock. When it comes to active labour
market policies, results are less clear-cut. There are economies whose employment increases and decreases
once the UK is included in the counterfactual of the fiscal union. Our approach can therefore provide some
insights into the development of the EU had Britain decided to separate itself from the potential European
fiscal union. Further details can be found in the Online Appendix.
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Figure 5.5: Change in the employment rate in various countries due the
regional unemployment benefits shock
formed a regional shock of 1% increase in unemployment benefits. The results in Figure
5.5 indicate that such a regional shock can statistically significantly decrease employment
in Ireland. Notice that the effect has substantially increased compared to the previous case
when unemployment benefits have been increased only to Ireland.
It is also interesting to compare the results in Figure 5.5 with our earlier panel regression
estimates and also with panel regressions in general. In this regional shock exercise we try
to estimate the effect of a particular labour market variable (unemployment benefits) on
employment. The task is in nature the same as in Section 2, motivating the study. It should
be noted, however, that this time we are accounting for dynamic and spatial developments
of countries, as well as their sizes, once the global (regional) dimension is accounted for. In
other words, GVAR allows to include not only spatial averages in a consistent manner, but
also exogenous policy variables, global variables, and non-zero contemporaneous dependence
of shocks across economies.
5.3 Response to Individual Country Reforms
In addition to the union-wide response, Figure 5.6 depicts reaction in employment in Belgium
due to structural changes in active labour market policies in each European economy. To
build a case for a fiscal union, we need to have the evidence of economies within a monetary
union transmitting positive and negative effects on the economy which is not undergoing any
reforms.
Figure 5.6 vividly demonstrates the point: had Belgium increased its expenditure on
active labour market policies, its employment would have increased. The same would have
happened even if it has not invested in ALMP but, among others, the Netherlands did.
However, had Finland, Ireland or the UK wanted to invigorate their labour markets through
ALMP, there would be a negative spillover and a drop in Belgium’s employment. Thus, this
evidence adds an additional argument favouring coordinated responses, at least if employ-
ment constituted an important objective variable.
An alternative way to see the effects of spillovers is, instead of shocking all economies one
by one as in Figure 5.6, to shock one economy and explore how homogeneous or heterogeneous
responses by other countries are. We shock the tax wedge in the Netherlands, thus making
the Dutch labour market more frictional (there is a larger difference in what employer pays
and employee receives). As is clear, Dutch employment suffers, as does that of Great Britain.
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Figure 5.6: Employment responses in Belgium to shocks in active labour
market policies implemented separately by every economy
However, Spanish employment increases quite substantially and persistently. A number of
other economies are also affected positively.
So far we have considered small open economies. It is, however, of interest to learn how the
largest economy of the EU is affecting other countries. We therefore collect evidence on how
GDP and openness react to an increase in the expenditure of active labour market policies in
Germany. For the theoretical predictions, recall that openness shall increase with subsidies
once we ignore spillovers (refer to equations (4.8) and (4.9)) and quite uncertain result
on GDP, as summarised in equation (4.4). Results are quite remarkable: GDP increases
in Germany on impact, but the effect fades quite quickly. Austria’s GDP reacts even more
strongly than that of Germany – it is a small open economy that is most reliant on Germany’
economic performance. On the opposite side, however, Greek GDP suffers most and the
decline in GDP is prolonged. When it comes to openness, Germany is getting the most
substantial effect, becoming a more open economy. Notice that if openness was the variable
of most importance to policy makers, then an argument in favour of a fiscal union would not
be that convincing. All economies reacted the same way and all of them got exposed to a
larger volume of trade.43
43Of course, our emphasis is on heterogeneity in signs; the change in magnitude can be also considered,
but requires more details on policy makers’ objective function to draw informative implications.
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Figure 5.7: Responses in all economies to a change in tax wedge in the
Netherlands
Figure 5.8: Responses to changes in German active labour market policies on
GDP and openness in every economy
6 Conclusions
Recent turbulent times have once again reminded us how important timely and effective
reactions are to dampen the effects of negative shocks. We analysed European unemploy-
ment and policy intervention from the global perspective. European economies are open,
interdependent, and may transmit labour market policies either through international prices,
reallocation of resources, structure of exporters, and access to a global unobserved factor.
Having laid a simple model, we established a number of channels through which labour
market policies affect the macroeconomy. Theory reveals that unemployment benefits tend
to increase wage costs which, in turn, affect the least productive domestic firms most severely.
This makes survival of non-exporters more difficult, and affects the aggregate openness of the
economy. At the same time, labour market tightness features a dampening effect. Similarly
to a famous model by Melitz (2003), a change in the price index makes sure that real
wages adjust and change the very composition of domestic producers and exporters. This
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clearly affects the real exchange rate, and thus calls for the empirical analysis that admits
international prices, employment, and openness in a single macroeconomic model.
We compute aggregate variables and map them into an estimating spatio-temporal econo-
metric framework. Observing that all aggregate variables are linked through firm threshold
productivities, we treat them all as endogenous, except for the variables describing labour
market policies and cross-sectionally averaged variables. The latter are used to proxy a global
factor and motivate a global VAR model. We extend the GVAR framework to accommodate
policy variables, which then allows us computing structural exogenous shocks. We find that
labour market policy shock in one country can have a substantial spillover effect to other
countries as well. With our framework at hand, we seek to answer three types of questions: a
counterfactual of a fiscal union, the degree of heterogeneity of responses in a single economy
to shocks conducted in every other country, and heterogeneity of responses by all economies
to a reform in one given economy.
Policy implications from the counterfactual exercises are important. We find evidence
that domestic labour market policies, which are used to solve local problems, also generate
unintended effects in the entire trading bloc. Theoretically, resource reallocation leads to a
different structure of the economy, as reflected in trade margins. An improvement in one
country can hurt other trading partners and be channeled back to the reforming economy.
Failure to account for these effects could lead to poor policies or even harm other member
states of a monetary union. A few counterfactuals of a fiscal union (with and without
the United Kingdom) are also conducted, which yield more homogenous and often stronger
responses than under a current arrangement of uncoordinated fiscal houses.
Lastly, our enquiry into the global dimension of labour markets in a trading bloc can
be extended in a number of directions. Labour market compositional effects seem to be of
particular interest; the main obstacle lies in comparable data with decent time dimension
across countries. We could then use generalised spatio-temporal impulse responses44 to track
how government policies affect home and foreign markets, transmit across trading partners,
and how this maps into labour force composition. We can also relate changes to the labour
market to long run growth through productivity changes (as in Helpman and Itskhoki (2010)
where worker’s productivity affects total factor productivity which can then be mapped into
technical progress). Interaction between technology and the labour force would be another
exciting track for future research, as well as exploration of other sources of interdependence,
including capital flows, migration, and technology diffusion.
44As proposed and implemented by Holly et al. (2010, 2011).
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Appendix
Refer to the Online Appendix, which collects evidence on other labour market reforms
with more limited time span that precluded us from using in the empirical exercise. Moreover,
the online document also reports theoretical results on econometrics of estimation, model
building, and impulse responses. We also collect all the impulse responses from our preferred
specifications for all the countries in that document.
A Data
A.1 Description and Sources
Table A.1: Data definitions and sources
Variable Definition Measure Source Adjustments
Public
expenditure on
active labour
market policies
Expenditure on public interventions, which
are explicitly targeted at groups of persons
with difficulties in the labour market: the
unemployed, the employed at risk of
involuntary job loss and inactive persons
who would like to enter the labour market.
Total expenditure on active measures can
be broken down into 7 categories, which
include labour market policy (LMP)
services (category 1) and LMP measures
(categories 2-7). LMP measures cover
activation measures for the unemployed and
other target groups including the categories
of training, job rotation and job sharing,
employment incentives, supported
employment and rehabilitation, direct job
creation, and start-up incentives.
Expenditure
per number of
unemployed
(we take the
number of
unemployed in
the previous
year) divided
by GDP per
capita
OECD,
Eurostat
Due to missing values in some time periods,
data for some LMP categories were linearly
interpolated. Expenditure on labour market
services for Greece during 2004-2010 was
obtained from Eurostat Labour database.
For Italy, expenditure on labour market
services during 1990-2003 was equated to
average expenditure during 2004-2011. In
order to keep Italy in the country dataset,
the total LMP data for Italy during
1985-1989 was equated to the first available
data point for Italy in 1990. Also,
Denmark’s LMP expenditure in 1985 was
equated to expenditure in 1986. In the
GVAR setting, quarterly data was obtained
from the annual values using Denton’s
interpolation method. The data was also
logarithmically transformed.
Population Resident population, i.e. all persons,
regardless of citizenship, who have a
permanent place of residence in the country.
1000s OECD
Real effective
exchange rate
Weighted average of a country’s currency
relative to an index or basket of other
major currencies adjusted for variations in
relative prices using unit labour costs in
manufacturing (for Greece, we used HICP).
The weights are determined by comparing
the relative trade balances, in terms of one
country’s currency, with each other country
within the index.
Index
(2000=100)
OECD,
Eurostat (for
Greece)
The data was logarithmically transformed.
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Variable Definition Measure Source Adjustments
Real gross
domestic
product
Value of all final goods and services
produced within an economy per
quarter/year, taking into account changes
in the general price level.
Index
(2000=100)
GVAR 2013
Vintage
database, IMF
International
Financial
Statistics
database,
OECD
National
Accounts
database,
Eurostat
The primary source is the GVAR 2013
Vintage database. The IMF International
Financial Statistics (IFS) database was also
consulted for Portugal and Denmark, GDP
Volume (2005=100). Data for Denmark
were seasonally adjusted using the U.S.
Census Bureu’s ARIMA X12. Statistics for
Luxembourg and Ireland, were obtained
from OECD National Accounts database.
The most extensive adjustments were made
to data pertinent to Greece. Data for
1980-1994 were obtained from OECD
National Accounts database. The base year
was adjusted (2000=100) with a backward
extrapolation till Q1 1980 using quarterly
growth rates based on the OECD estimates.
Data from 1995 onwards were extracted
from Eurostat and seasonally adjusted with
ARIMA X12. The data was also
logarithmically transformed.
Tax wedge Income tax plus employee and employer
social security contributions less cash
benefits as % of labour cost.
In the data sources, tax wedge is calculated
for a one-earner married couple at 100% of
average earnings having 2 children.
Percentage OECD
database,
Taxing Wages
2004
The data was spliced using 2 data sources:
OECD database and Taxing Wages 2004.
Biannual data until 2000 was linearly
interpolated. In the GVAR setting, data
was interpolated to quarterly frequency
using Denton’s method. Lastly, the data
was logarithmically transformed.
Output gap Percentage of
potential GDP
IMF, World
Economic
Outlook
Database,
April 2014
Openness Ratio of nominal trade to nominal GDP Authors’
computation
using data
from Eurostat,
OECD
Where quarterly data was not available,
data was constructed interpolating annual
data (Denton’s method).
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Variable Definition Measure Source Adjustments
Unemployment
rate
Number of unemployed persons as a
percentage of the labour force with a
seasonal adjustment.
Percentage Eurostat
Labour Market
database, IMF
International
Financial
Statistics
database,
OECD Labour
database
Q1 1983 - Q2 1998 data for Greece was
interpolated from OECD annual data using
Denton’s interpolation method. For
Austria, Finland and Germany, where
Eurostat quarterly unemployment data was
not available, it was constructed from
annual IMF data using Chow-Lin
interpolation method (quarterly indicator
series was constructed from quarterly
registered unemployed series and
interpolated annual labour force series). In
case of Spain, as Eurostat and OECD
annual data for this country exhibits
certain differences, Eurostat annual data
were extrapolated using annual OECD data
and then the latter annual series was
interpolated using Chow-Lin method
(quarterly indicator series was constructed
from quarterly registered unemployed series
and interpolated annual labour force
series). The data was also logarithmically
transformed.
Unemployment
replacement
rate
Proportion of net in-work income that is
maintained when unemployed. The OECD
summary measure is defined as the average
of the gross unemployment benefit
replacement rates for two earnings levels,
three family situations and three durations
of unemployment. For further details, see
OECD (1994), The OECD Jobs Study
(chapter 8) and Martin J. (1996),
“Measures of Replacement Rates for the
Purpose of International Comparisons: A
Note”, OECD Economic Studies, No. 26.
Pre-2003 data have been revised.
Rate, values
between 0 and
1
OECD Biannual data was linearly interpolated to
annual data. In the GVAR setting, data
was also interpolated to quarterly frequency
using Denton’s method. Data was spliced
from two OECD measurements, keeping
original data till 2005 and rescaling after
2005. The data was also logarithmically
transformed.
A.2 Construction of Weight Matrices
GVAR estimation was executed using a user-built time-varying matrix (1980-2012). The
weights were constructed from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database. Missing
data for Belgium (1980-1997) were extrapolated from trade statistics on Belgium-Luxembourg.
Also, data for Luxembourg (1980-1997) were extrapolated from trade weights in year 1997.
Weights pertinent to Sweden’s trade (1980-1995) with Denmark, where Denmark is the part-
ner country, were constructed on assumption that Denmark’s trade weights with Sweden,
the latter as a partner country, are equal to weights where Sweden is the reporting country.
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A.3 Summary Statistics
Refer to the Table A.2.
Table A.2: Basic summary statistics for labour market policy variables
Country
Expenditure on active
labour market policies
Unemployment benefits Labour tax wedge
mean sd min max mean sd min max mean sd min max
Austria 10.09 0.25 9.50 10.72 -1.18 0.05 -1.34 -1.11 3.51 0.11 3.32 3.66
Belgium 10.23 0.20 9.90 10.74 -0.90 0.04 -0.96 -0.84 3.72 0.04 3.63 3.78
Denmark 10.72 0.46 9.99 11.46 -0.60 0.08 -0.71 -0.42 3.44 0.07 3.34 3.62
Finland 10.13 0.37 9.74 11.24 -1.04 0.05 -1.12 -0.94 3.64 0.06 3.48 3.75
France 10.14 0.20 9.73 10.43 -0.96 0.05 -1.09 -0.82 3.61 0.18 3.10 3.76
Germany 10.27 0.34 9.55 11.12 -1.32 0.07 -1.45 -1.22 3.58 0.04 3.49 3.68
Greece 8.64 0.39 7.24 9.35 -2.10 0.27 -2.67 -1.75 3.64 0.12 3.19 3.78
Ireland 10.11 0.28 9.69 10.77 -1.17 0.14 -1.35 -0.73 2.68 0.88 0.34 3.42
Italy 9.32 0.40 8.72 10.00 -2.25 1.59 -6.21 -0.91 3.74 0.11 3.57 3.88
Luxembourg 10.17 0.42 9.41 10.95 - - - - 2.64 0.21 2.26 3.07
Netherlands 10.84 0.46 10.15 11.90 -0.72 0.18 -1.09 -0.57 3.42 0.07 3.32 3.55
Portugal 9.70 0.54 8.30 10.43 -1.01 0.18 -1.64 -0.78 3.39 0.08 3.23 3.60
Spain 9.17 0.50 8.25 9.93 -1.06 0.03 -1.16 -1.02 3.52 0.03 3.46 3.59
Sweden 11.10 0.67 10.15 12.47 -1.16 0.16 -1.44 -0.89 3.76 0.07 3.62 3.87
United Kingdom 9.25 0.33 8.70 9.88 -1.76 0.08 -1.90 -1.56 3.41 0.09 3.23 3.53
Note: the variables are quarterly, spanning from Q1 1985 to Q4 2009 (100 observations per variable). The summary statistics are calculated for
log levels.
B Cross Sectional Dependence
To motivate our interest in trade as a shock transmission channel, we use Moran’s I statistics
to measure spatial correlation among variables of different EU countries. The test statistic
is defined as
I = N∑
i
∑
j
wij
∑
i
∑
j
wij(xi − x)(xj − x)∑
i
(xi − x)2
,
where wi,j = Country’s i trade with country jCountry’s i trade with the world . Under no spatial autocorrelation, E (I) =
−1
N−1 ,
where N is the number of countries considered. Having identical weights, they can be taken
out from the summation, and the resulting expression would be equal to zero. Hence, a
statistically significant relationship demonstrates whether the chosen weighting scheme can
be attributed as a factor generating spatial correlation. We examine macro variables for 28
EU countries with wij constructed using Direction of Trade Statistics in 2005.
We plot the p-values for the Moran’s I statistic in Figure B.1. The lower the value, the
more evidence there is to reject the null of no spatial autocorrelation. Evidently, GDPs tend
to be spatially autocorrelated in all periods but the financial crisis. In contrast, unemploy-
ment seems to be more strongly associated in space in the last years.
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Figure B.1: Annual changes in GDP and unemployment
C Proofs and Derivations
C.1 Firm Level Variables
C.1.1 Cutoff Productivities
A ϕ-productivity firm with the measure of hired workers, hit (ϕ) , pays an equilibrium wage
wit. The free entry condition implies that the firm’s value, in expected value terms, must
equal the sunk entry costs.45 The zero profit condition for the domestic producer can be
related to revenues r (ϕd) by
pi (ϕd) = (1− β) rit (ϕd) + θ1−ηit hit (ϕd)− fd = 0,
or, after a few modifications,
ϕ
β
1−β
d =
fd
A
1
1−β
it A
λi
β
1−β
t
[
(1− β) (rit/hit)
β
β−1 + θ1−ηit (rit/hit)
1
β−1
] , (C.1)
where we used the fact that ϕd = ϕx for the marginal exporter (the one at the exporting
threshold who is indifferent between exporting and remaining solely a domestic producer).
This leads to the following lemma that relates extensive margin and labour market institu-
tions.
Lemma 3. The structure of active firms changes with labour market policies: share of
exporters increases with a rise in unemployment benefits and decreases with employment
contingent incentives, holding labour market tightness constant, in particular, ∂ϕ
β
1−β
d
∂Θi
∂Θi
∂bi
>
0, ∂ϕ
β
1−β
d
∂Θi
∂Θi
∂ei
< 0, where Θi ≡ bi − ei + κ1−κθi.
45The value function for a firm J F , averaged by all firms, shall equal to the entry costs fe, i.e.,´∞
0 J Fit (hit; ϕ) dG (ϕ) = fe. As is usual, we can use this result to derive the equilibrium measure of active
firms in the economy. However, our aggregate data do not allow us to operationalise this equilibrium res-
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Proof. To prove the lemma’s statement, start with differentiating threshold productivity for
the domestic producer (disregarding country notation),
∂ϕ
β
1−β
d
∂Θ = − (1− κ)
(
βγAtAλiβt
κβ+1−κ
) 1
1−β [
Θ +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
x−1
] 1
β−1
[
(1− β) Θ +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
x−1
]
×
[
1
β−1 [Θ+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1]
−1+(1−β)[(1−β)Θ+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1]
−1][
(1−κ)
(
βγAtA
λiβ
t
κβ+1−κ
) 1
1−β
[Θ+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1]
1
β−1 [(1−β)Θ+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1]
]2
=
−
[
1
β−1 [Θ+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1]
−1+(1−β)[(1−β)Θ+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1]
−1]
(1−κ)
(
βγAtA
λiβ
t
κβ+1−κ
) 1
1−β
[Θ+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1]
1
β−1 [(1−β)Θ+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1]
=
−
[
1
β−1 [Θ+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1]
−1+(1−β)[(1−β)Θ+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1]
−1]
βfd
ϕ
β
1−β
d .
Hence, elasticity is given by
ϕd,Θ = Θ
−
[[
(1− β) Θ +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
x−1
]−1 − ( 11−β)2 [Θ + ( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1]−1
]
fd
.
Note that
1
β−1
[
Θ +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
x−1
]−1
+ (1− β)
[
(1− β) Θ +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
x−1
]−1
< 0,
because β < 1 and[
Θ +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
x−1
]−1
> (1− β)2
[
(1− β) Θ +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
x−1
]−1
is satisfied for any value of β ∈ (0, 1]. However, the qualification for the last result is that
the terms in brackets are positive (the sufficient condition is b > e). It then trivially follows
from Θ ≡ b− e+ κ1−κθ that
∂ϕ
β
1−β
d
∂Θ > 0,
∂ϕ
β
1−β
d
∂Θ
∂Θ
∂b
> 0, ∂ϕ
β
1−β
d
∂Θ
∂Θ
∂e
< 0, ∂ϕ
β
1−β
d
∂Θ
∂Θ
∂θ
> 0.
The intuition for the results stated in the lemma is quite simple: since benefits are covered
by firms, that makes production costlier and thus increases the threshold productivity. The
subsidy works just in an opposite way - it can be thought of as an exogenous reduction in
the production costs. The change in labour market tightness causes a positive change in
the domestic productivity cutoff, i.e., ∂ϕ
β
1−β
d
∂Θi
∂Θi
∂θi
> 0. Hence, the results in Lemma 3 can
be extended to varying θi but then depend on the relative magnitudes of unemployment
benefits and subsidies, as will be covered in the following Section.46 In other words, the full
rather than a partial effect admits both signs - this is consistent with heterogeneous impulse
responses we cover in the empirical part of the paper. Interestingly, the impulse responses
ult. For the derivation, we split the value generated by domestic sales and exports and note that only a
per-period profit matters when there is no adjustment in the employment.
46It also depends on relative sizes of parameters β and κ.
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from a counterfactual of joint changes in labour market regulation comply to the theoretical
partial effect.
Similarly, by considering equation revenue function and the zero profit condition for the
exporter, we obtain the export margin for a generic exporter, defined as
pi (ϕx) = (1− β) rit (ϕx) + θ1−ηit hit (ϕx) = fd + fx,
therefore, yielding
ϕ
β
1−β
x =
fx
(Υx − 1)A
1
1−β
it A
λi
β
1−β
t
(
(1− β) (rit/hit)
β
β−1 + θ1−ηit (rit/hit)
1
β−1
) , (C.2)
where we substituted fd from equation (C.1) evaluated at ϕx. Let’s denote ρ ≡ ϕd/ϕx ∈ [0, 1]
to stand for an extensive margin of trade – it determines the fraction of exporting firms,
ρz = (1−G (ϕx)) (1−G (ϕd))−1. The intensive margin of trade openness, as captured by
the market access variable, Υx > 1, determines the ratio of revenues from domestic sales
and exporting. These two dimensions of trade openness are linked through the relationship
between the productivity cutoffs. Divide threshold productivities to obtain
(Υx − 1)
(
ϕx
ϕd
) β
1−β
= fx
fd
. (C.3)
C.1.2 Labour Market Tightness and Productivity
We follow Felbermayr et al. (2011a) which derived the job creation curve using a marginal
revenue condition in the wage curve in a one sector trade model. Our approach is similar –
notice that the term Γitϕβhβ−1it is the marginal revenue (refer to above, in particular Online
Appendix for full derivations). Having the isoelastic demand structure, differentiate revenue
function rit (ϕ) = Υit (ϕ)1−β AitϕβhβitAβλit with respect to hit to arrive at
Γitϕβhβ−1it = βE
1−β
it P
β
ity
β−1
it (ϕ) ∂yit(ϕ)∂hit
= βE1−βit P
β
ity
β−1
it (ϕ)ϕAλit = βpit (ϕ˜) ϕ˜Aλit = βϕ˜Aλit ,
where one could use a convenient normalisation, as in Felbermayr et al. (2011a), and defined
average productivity ϕ˜ such that pit (ϕ˜) = 1. Hence, the job creation curve is given by
wit (ϕ) =
βκ
1 + κβ − κϕ˜A
λi
t + (1− κ)
(
bit − eit + κ1− κθit
)
. (C.4)
Recalling the Harris-Todaro condition, we can establish a relationship between labour market
tightness and the average productivity in the economy, namely
(1− κ)
(
bit − eit + κ1− κθit
)
= 1− βκ1 + κβ − κϕ˜A
λi
t .
Obviously, there is a negative relationship between the average productivity and labour
market tightness. A more direct approach would be to observe such a relationship from
wage equation, which is valid for all productivity levels, so also for the average one.
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C.2 Aggregate Variables
C.2.1 Steady-state Unemployment
ui = 1[
s
(δ+s)
2−η
η wi(h;ϕ)
] η
2−η
+1
= 1[
s
(δ+s)
2−η
η (bi−ei+ κ1−κ(θi+(r+δ+s)x−1i ))
] η
2−η
+1
= 1[
s
(δ+s)
2−η
η (Θi+(r+δ+s) κ1−κx−1i )
] η
2−η
+1
.
C.2.2 General Price Index
To derive the general price index, we start with the aggregator P =
[´
ω∈J p (ω)
− β1−β dω
]− 1−β
β
which leads to
Pit =
[´
ω∈J pit (ω)
− β1−β dω
]− 1−β
β
=
[´∞
ϕi,d
(
ϕβ−1hβ−1it Aλi(β−1)t
)− β1−β Mii g(ϕ)1−G(ϕi,d)dϕ
+∑j 6=i ´∞ϕj,x (τjiϕβ−1hβ−1jt Aβ−1t )− β1−β Mji g(ϕ)1−G(ϕj,x) 1−G(ϕj,x)1−G(ϕi,d)dϕ
]− 1−β
β
=
[(
ϕi,d
ϕmin
)z Aλiβt ´∞ϕi,d (ϕβ−1hβ−1it )− β1−β Miiz ϕzminϕz+1 dϕ
+ ∑j 6=iAλjβt τ− β1−βji ( ϕi,xϕmin)z ´∞ϕj,x (ϕβ−1hβ−1jt )− β1−β Mjiz ϕzminϕz+1 (ϕi,dϕj,x)z dϕ
]− 1−β
β
=
[
Aλiβt z
[
Miiϕ
z
i,d
´∞
ϕi,d
hβitϕ
β−z−1dϕ+∑j 6=iA(λj−λi)βt τ− β1−βji ϕzj,xMji (ϕi,dϕj,x)z ´∞ϕj,x hβjtϕβ−z−1dϕ
]]− 1−β
β
,
and upon substituting the equilibrium (linear) employment level,
Pit =
Aλiβt z
Mii [Θit + ( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1it ] ββ−1
(
βγAtAλiβt
κβ+1−κ
) β
1−β 1−β
z(1−β)−βϕ
β
1−β
i,d
+∑j 6=iA(λj−λi)βt τ− β1−βji Mji [Θjt + ( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1jt ] ββ−1
(
βγAtAλjβt
κβ+1−κ
) β
1−β
Υβx (ϕ) 1−βz(1−β)−β
(
ϕi,d
ϕj,x
)z
ϕ
β
1−β
j,x
−
1−β
β
=
[
z(1−β)
z(1−β)−β
[
Miip
β
β−1
it (ϕi,d) +
∑
j 6=i τ
− β1−β
ji Mjip
β
β−1
jt (ϕj,x)
]]− 1−β
β
,
where firm’s prices are evaluated at cutoff levels of productivities, namely
p
β
β−1
it (ϕi,d) =
(
κβ+1−κ
βγ
) β
β−1
[
Θit+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1it
AtAλit
] β
β−1
ϕ
− β
β−1
d ,
p
β
β−1
jt (ϕj,x) =
(
κβ+1−κ
βγ
) β
β−1
[
Θjt+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1jt
AtAλjt Υx(ϕ)1−β
] β
β−1 (ϕi,d
ϕj,x
)z
ϕ
− β
β−1
j,x .
C.2.3 Terms of Trade
To derive the terms of trade, first produce the average productivities for non-exporters and
exporters. Namely,
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ϕ˜d ≡
(´∞
ϕd
ϕ
β
1−β dG(ϕ)
1−G(ϕd)
) 1−β
β
=
(
z(1−β)
z(1−β)−βϕ
β
1−β
d
) 1−β
β
, z > β1−β ,
ϕ˜x ≡
(´∞
ϕx
ϕ
β
1−β dG(ϕ)
1−G(ϕx)
) 1−β
β
=
(
z(1−β)
z(1−β)−βϕ
β
1−β
x
) 1−β
β
.
Evaluating prices of importables and exportables at averages,
ToTij,t = εij,t
(
ϕ˜i,x
ϕ˜j,x
)1−β ( hit(ϕ˜i,x)
hjt(ϕ˜j,x)
)(1−β)A(λj−λi)(β−1)t
= εij,t
(
ϕ˜i,x
ϕ˜j,x
)1−β

(
Γitϕ˜
β
i,x
κβ+1−κ
) 1
1−β
[Θit+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1it ]
1
β−1(
Γjtϕ˜
β
j,x
κβ+1−κ
) 1
1−β
[Θjt+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1jt ]
1
β−1

(1−β)
A(λj−λi)(β−1)t
= εij,t
(
ϕ˜i,x
ϕ˜j,x
)
Γit
Γjt
Θjt+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1jt
Θit+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1it
A(λj−λi)(β−1)t
= εij,t
(
ϕ˜i,x
ϕ˜j,x
) Υi,x(ϕ)1−βAit
Υj,x(ϕ)1−βAjt
Θjt+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1jt
Θit+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1it
A−(λj−λi)t .
C.2.4 Real Exchange Rate
Using general price indices,
RER
β
1−β
ij,t = ε
β
1−β
ij,t A
(λi−λj) β1−β
t
(
ϕi,d
ϕj,d
) β
1−β
×
Mii[Θit+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1it ]
β
β−1A
β
1−β
it +
∑
j 6=iA
(λj−λi) β1−β
t τ
− β1−β
ji Mji[Θjt+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1jt ]
β
β−1A
β
1−β
jt Υ
β
x(ϕ)
(
ϕi,d
ϕj,x
)z− β1−β
Mjj[Θjt+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1jt ]
β
β−1A
β
1−β
jt +
∑
` 6=j A
(λ`−λj) β1−β
t τ
− β1−β
`j
M`j[Θ`t+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1`t ]
β
β−1A
β
1−β
`t
Υβx(ϕ)
(
ϕj,d
ϕ`,x
)z− β1−β .
Taking partial derivatives with respect to Θ, and rearranging into elasticities, give
RERij,t,Θit = ϕi,d,Θit
+Mii[Θit+(
r+δ+s
1−κ )x−1it ]
1
β−1A
β
1−β
it Θit
4
−(
z(1−β)−β
β )
∑
j 6=iA
(λj−λi) β1−β
t τ
− β1−β
ji Mji[Θjt+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1jt ]
β
β−1A
β
1−β
jt Υ
β
x(ϕ)
(
ϕi,d
ϕj,x
)z− β1−β
ϕi,d,Θit
4
= ϕi,d,Θit
+ Mii[Θit+(
r+δ+s
1−κ )x−1it ]
1
β−1A
β
1−β
it Θit
P
β
β−1
it A
−λi β1−β
t ( z(1−β)z(1−β)−β )
−1( βγκβ+1−κ)
− β1−β ϕ
− β1−β
i,d
−(
z(1−β)−β
β )
∑
j 6=iA
(λj−λi) β1−β
t τ
− β1−β
ji Mji[Θjt+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1jt ]
β
β−1A
β
1−β
jt Υ
β
x(ϕ)
(
ϕi,d
ϕj,x
)z− β1−β
ϕi,d,Θit
P
β
β−1
it A
−λi β1−β
t ( z(1−β)z(1−β)−β )
−1( βγκβ+1−κ)
− β1−β ϕ
− β1−β
i,d
= ϕi,d,Θit +
z(1−β)
z(1−β)−β
Mii[Θit+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1it ]
β
β−1−1A
β
1−β
it Θit
P
β
β−1
it A
−λi β1−β
t ( βγκβ+1−κ)
− β1−β ϕ
− β1−β
i,d
− z(1−β)
β
∑
j 6=iA
(λj−λi) β1−β
t τ
− β1−β
ji Mji[Θjt+( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1jt ]
β
β−1A
β
1−β
jt Υ
β
x(ϕ)
(
ϕi,d
ϕj,x
)z− β1−β
ϕi,d,Θit
P
β
β−1
it A
−λi β1−β
t ( βγκβ+1−κ)
− β1−β ϕ
− β1−β
i,d
,
where
4 ≡Mii
[
Θit +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
x−1it
] β
β−1 A
β
1−β
it
+∑j 6=iA(λj−λi) β1−βt τ− β1−βji Mji [Θjt + ( r+δ+s1−κ )x−1jt ] ββ−1 A β1−βjt Υβx (ϕ) (ϕi,dϕj,x)z− β1−β .
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Though the elasticity of the cutoff productivity level with respect to Θit is positive, the
subtracted term is either larger or smaller than the first two terms. This confirms the claim
in the main text.
C.2.5 Multi-country Trade Flows
The total revenue of exports is defined as EXit =
∑
j 6=i
´∞
ϕij,x
p
β
β−1
ij,t
P
β
β−1
jt
Ejt
dG(ϕ)
1−G(ϕij,x) , which leads
to
EXit =
∑
j 6=i
´∞
ϕij,x
p
β
β−1
ij,t
P
β
β−1
jt
Ejt
dG(ϕ)
1−G(ϕij,x) =
∑
j 6=i
´∞
ϕij,x
τ
β
β−1
ij ϕ
βhβitA
λiβ
t
P
β
β−1
jt
Ejt
dG(ϕ)
1−G(ϕij,x)
= ∑j 6=i τ
β
β−1
ij A
λiβ
t
P
β
β−1
jt
Ejt
´∞
ϕij,x
ϕβhβit
zϕzminϕ
−z−1dϕ
1−G(ϕij,x)
= ∑j 6=i τ
β
β−1
ij A
λiβ
t
P
β
β−1
jt
(
βAitAλiβt
κβ+1−κ
) β
1−β [
Θit +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
x−1it
] β
β−1 Ejt
(
1
ϕij,x
)−z
zΥβij,x 1−βz(1−β)−βϕ
β
1−β−z
ij,x
= ∑j 6=i τ
β
β−1
ij A
λi
β
1−β
t
P
β
β−1
jt
(
βAit
κβ+1−κ
) β
1−β
[
Θit +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
x−1it
] β
β−1 EjtΥβij,x z(1−β)z(1−β)−βϕ
β
1−β
ij,x
= z(1−β)
z(1−β)−β
∑
j 6=i
(
τijpjt(ϕij,x)
Pjt
) β
β−1 Ejt.
Hence, the openness ratio is
EXit
Eit
= z(1−β)
z(1−β)−β
[
Θit +
(
r+δ+s
1−κ
)
x−1it
] β
β−1 Aλi
β
1−β
t
(
βγAit
κβ+1−κ
) β
1−β ∑
j 6=i
Ejt
Eit
(
τij/ϕij,x
Pjt
) β
β−1 Υβij,x.
C.3 From Theory to Empirics
C.3.1 Model III: Global Unobserved Factor
As mentioned in the main text, we could have used another solution for the unobserved
multilateral term. We can also proxy Πit with a global factor with a varying factor loading,
depending on the particular economy. In other words, we account for the country specific
and time-varying effect using a common factor approach, i.e., ln Πit ≈ γi lnFt, while keeping
in mind that Πit is a function of aggregates already included in the specification. Plugging
this back into equation (4.10), taking logs, summing, and simplifying yield
ln (EXit/Eit) = β˜i +
(
β
1−β
)
ln (1− uit) +
(
β
(
β
β−1
)
− 1
)
ln (Eit/Pit)
−γi ln (EXit/Eit)? − β1−βγi ln (1− uit)? − γi
(
β
(
β
β−1
)
− 1
)
ln (Eit/Pit)? .
This specification tells that openness is related to employment, real GDP, and cross-sectional
averages of openness, employment, and real GDP. This method loses some information con-
tained in the unobservable term, and therefore emphasise other solutions more. However,
empirical results, which are largely comparable to the benchmark model, can be obtained
from the authors.
C.3.2 Real Effective Exchange Rate
Rewrite the aggregate gravity in (4.10) as
ln
(
EXit
Eit
)
= ln z(1−β)
z(1−β)−β (δ + s)
β
1−β + ln (1− uit)
β
1−β + ln
(
Eit
Pit
)β( ββ−1)−1 + λi lnFt + ln reerit,
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take cross-sectional averages
∑
i ωi ln
(
EXit
Eit
)
= ln z(1−β)
z(1−β)−β (δ + s)
β
1−β
∑
i ωi
+∑i ωi ln (1− uit) β1−β +∑i ωi ln (EitPit )β( ββ−1)−1 + lnFt∑i ωiλi +∑i ωi ln reerit,
and express the unobserved dynamic factor as
lnFt = (
∑
i ωiλi)−1
(∑
i ωi ln
(
EXit
Eit
)
− ln z(1−β)
z(1−β)−β (δ + s)
β
1−β
−∑i ωi ln (1− uit) β1−β −∑i ωi ln (EitPit )β( ββ−1)−1 −∑i ωi ln reerit
)
.
After substituting back, this procedure yields
ln
(
EXit
Eit
)
=
(
1− λi∑
i
ωiλi
)
ln z(1−β)
z(1−β)−β (δ + s)
β
1−β + β1−β ln (1− uit) +
(
β
(
β
β−1
)
− 1
)
ln
(
Eit
Pit
)
+ λi∑
i
ωiλi
(∑
i ωi ln
(
EXit
Eit
)
− β1−β
∑
i ωi ln (1− uit)−
(
β
(
β
β−1
)
− 1
)∑
i ωi ln
(
Eit
Pit
)
−∑i ωi ln reerit)
+ ln reerit.
C.3.3 Global Unobserved Factor
Rewrite the aggregate gravity in (4.10) as
lnEXit/Eit = ln
z (1− β)
z (1− β)− β (δ + s)
β
1−β+ β1− β ln (1− uit)+
(
β
(
β
β − 1
)
− 1s
)
ln (Eit/Pit)+γi lnFt.
(C.5)
Taking cross-sectionally weighted averages yields
∑
ωi ln (EXit/Eit) = ln z(1−β)z(1−β)−β (δ + s)
β
1−β
∑
ωi
+∑ωi ln (1− uit) β1−β +∑ωi ln (Eit/Pit)β( ββ−1)−1 +∑ωiγi lnFt,
therefore, helping to express the unobservable dynamic factor as
lnFt = (
∑
ωiγi)−1
(∑
ωi ln (EXit/Eit)− ln z(1−β)z(1−β)−β (δ + s)
β
1−β
∑
ωi
−∑ωi β1−β ln (1− uit)−∑ωi (β ( ββ−1)− 1) ln (Eit/Pit)) .
Plugging into (C.5) yields
ln (EXit/Eit) = ln z(1−β)z(1−β)−β (δ + s)
β
1−β +
(
β
1−β
)
ln (1− uit) +
(
β
(
β
β−1
)
− 1
)
ln (Eit/Pit)
−γi
∑
ωi ln(EXit/Eit)∑
ωiγi
− ln z(1−β)
z(1−β)−β (δ + s)
β
1−β γi∑
ωiγi
− β1−βγi
ln
∑
ωi(1−uit)∑
ωiγi
− γi
∑
ωi(β( ββ−1)−1) ln(Eit/Pit)∑
ωiγi
,
which is as reported in the main text, just using a simpler notation for cross-sectionally
weighted variables.
C.3.4 Linearisation (no global technology)
Define the multilateral resistance term as
ln Πit = ln
∑
j 6=i
(
τij,t/ϕijt,x
Pjt
) β
β−1
(
Pit
Pjt
)
Ejt
Pjt
Υβijt,x ,
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then linearisation yields
f (β) = f (0) + (β − 0) f ′ (0)
= ln∑j 6=i (PitPjt) EjtPjt + β
∑
j 6=i
((
Pit
Pjt
)
Ejt
Pjt
(
ln Υijt,x−ln
(
τij,t/ϕijt,x
Pjt
)))
∑
j 6=i
(
Pit
Pjt
)
Ejt
Pjt
= ln reerit + β
∑
j 6=i
((
Pit
Pjt
)
Ejt
Pjt
(
ln Υijt,x−ln
(
τij,t/ϕijt,x
Pjt
)))
reerit
= ln reerit + β
∑
j 6=i
(
rerji,t
reerit
(
ln Υijt,x − β−1β ln
(
EXij,t
Ejt
)))
.
Linearising the main part gives
ln (EXit/Eit) = ln (Eit/Pit)−1 + β ln (1− uit) + ln reerit
+β∑j 6=i rerji,treerit ln Υijt,x − (β − 1)∑j 6=i rerji,treerit ln (EXij,tEjt ) ,
since d ln(EXit/Eit)
dβ
= 1(1−β)2 ln (1− uit) +
(
(β−2)β
(β−1)2
)
ln (Eit/Pit) . Since market access term Υijt,x
is unobservable, we proxy for it using a real exchange rate (see Helpman et al. (2012), where
it is noted that the market access term is affected by fluctuations in real exchange rate (due
to dependence on conditions in both markets, and frictions between them). We therefore
finally arrive at
ln
(
EXit
Eit
)
= ln
(
Eit
Pit
)−1
+ β ln (1− uit) + ln reerit + β∑j 6=i rerji,treerit ln Υijt,x − (β − 1)∑j 6=i rerji,treerit ln (EXij,tEjt )
= ln
(
Eit
Pit
)−1
+ β ln (1− uit) + ln reerit + β1−β
∑
j 6=i
rerji,t
reerit
ln
(
β
δ+s
)
+ β1−β
∑
j 6=i
rerji,t
reerit
ln
(
Ejt
Pjt
)β
− β1−β
∑
j 6=i
rerji,t
reerit
ln (1− ujt)− (β − 1)∑j 6=i rerji,treerit ln (EXij,tEjt ) ,
which, after manipulation, yields
ln reerit = β1−β ln
(
β
δ+s
)∑
j 6=i
rerji,t
reerit
+
[
ln
(
Eit
Pit
)−1 − β
β−1
∑
j 6=i
rerji,t
reerit
ln
(
Ejt
Pjt
)β]
+
[
ln (1− uit)β − 11−β
∑
j 6=i
rerji,t
reerit
ln (1− ujt)β
]
−
[
ln
(
EXit
Eit
)
− (1− β)∑j 6=i rerji,treerit ln (EXij,tEjt )] .
D Further Empirical Results
More results on the validity of the model and a number of statistical tests are available from
the authors upon request. We report more shocks in labour market policies, also major
diagnostics, i.e., weak exogeneity, number of cointegrating relations, residual correlations,
and persistence profiles, computed for the benchmark Model I. Refer to Online Appendix
for further results.
We start with the Figure D.1 where we plot changes in real exchange rate due to reforms
in domestic active labour market policies implemented separately by each economy. There
is a tendency for more and less open economies to cluster together. The wide heterogeneity
in responses – both positive and negative sides – complies to the result in Section 4.1.
According to the theory, there are three major channels at work: the effect through domestic
productivity which alters firm’s structure (non-exporters vs exporters), the direct effect on
prices, and the indirect effect on prices of exportables through the changed productivity
level.
D.1 Additional Models
There are no substantial differences in the results of the further models compared to Model
I and II, reported in the main text.
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Figure D.1: Changes in REER due to shocks in domestic active labour market
policies
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Figure D.2: Change in unemployment rate in various countries due the
increase in expenditure on labour market policies in Portugal
First, note that the first part of the figure refers to Model I with employment being
changed to unemployment. Therefore, one should expect opposite direction to what we saw
on all other models. All the directions remain comparable for Model III in Figure D.2 – the
only difference is that employment in Germany tends to increase significantly, thus making
the spillover effect even more pronounced. The results for Model I with ln uit are largely
comparable with impulse responses looking “inverted” as compared to Model I.
Similarly, Figure D.3 demonstrates that a higher tax wedge in Italy (difference in the
employer’s and employee’s wage) decreases its employment but tends to increase employ-
ment in Spain. Somewhat positive effects are exerted on Germany and Greece but they are
not significant. Similar significance with opposite directions remain true for Model I with
unemployment.
Unemployment benefits, as before, affect Irish employment as well as spill over to other
economies, where they tend to increase employment on impact, but later converge to a
negative sign. Similar behaviour is reported in the model with unemployment – the impact is
the reduction of unemployment but this effect is dominated by an increase in unemployment
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Figure D.3: Change in unemployment rate in various countries due the
increase in tax wedge in Italy
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Figure D.4: Change in unemployment rate in various countries due the
increase in unemployment benefits in Ireland
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Figure D.5: Change in unemployment rate in various countries due the
regional unemployment benefits shock
over time.
As in the main text, the regional shock is most pronounced on Ireland, but not significant
for the largest European economies. The Irish economy has reacted more profoundly to the
regional shock than to its individual one, consistent with the findings previously.
D.2 More Diagnostics
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Table D.1: F statistics for testing weak exogeneity of foreign variables in the
country specific models (Model I)
Country
F test’s critical value Foreign variables
(5% significance) GDP REER Employment
Austria 3.10 0.71 0.39 0.08
Belgium 3.95 0.00 0.00 1.69
Denmark 3.10 1.12 0.19 1.60
Finland 3.10 1.29 0.33 0.50
France 3.10 0.26 0.31 0.24
Germany 3.10 0.48 0.20 0.02
Greece 3.10 0.30 0.58 0.99
Ireland 3.95 1.59 0.08 0.09
Italy 3.10 1.63 1.97 0.30
Luxembourg 3.10 1.41 0.02 0.18
Netherlands 3.95 2.33 0.13 0.02
Portugal 3.95 0.34 0.26 1.26
Spain 3.10 1.18 1.17 0.78
Sweden 3.10 0.86 0.54 0.12
United Kingdom 3.10 2.91 2.23 0.20
Note: our country specific models do not include openness as a foreign variable, therefore we do
not test weak exogeneity of openness.
Table D.2: Specifications of country specific models (Model I)
Country
VARX(pi,qi) Cointegrating
pi qi relations
Austria 2 1 2
Belgium 1 1 1
Denmark 1 1 2
Finland 2 1 2
France 2 1 2
Germany 2 1 2
Greece 1 1 2
Ireland 2 1 1
Italy 2 1 2
Luxembourg 2 1 2
Netherlands 2 1 1
Portugal 1 1 1
Spain 2 1 2
Sweden 2 1 2
United Kingdom 2 1 2
To achieve stability of the GVAR model the number of cointegrating
relations was reduced in some countries from what was suggested by
Johansen’s test trace statistic. Specifically, we reduced the number of
cointegrating relations in these cases: Ireland from 2 to 1, Greece from
3 to 2, and Spain from 3 to 2.
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Table D.3: F statistics for testing residual serial correlation in country specific
models (Model I)
Country
F test’s critical value Endogenous variables
(5% significance) GDP REER Employment Openness
Austria 2.48 1.02 2.01 4.15 2.49
Belgium 2.48 0.97 0.22 2.73 1.24
Denmark 2.48 2.30 1.01 2.97 2.54
Finland 2.48 2.17 1.49 0.58 5.07
France 2.48 0.60 0.52 2.06 1.40
Germany 2.48 1.30 0.58 1.49 1.46
Greece 2.48 1.16 0.34 1.46 3.06
Ireland 2.48 0.52 0.54 5.97 0.30
Italy 2.48 2.39 0.78 0.87 2.87
Luxembourg 2.48 0.15 0.84 0.80 0.85
Netherlands 2.48 0.77 2.24 2.65 3.72
Portugal 2.48 1.01 0.39 1.08 2.63
Spain 2.48 2.54 2.66 0.38 1.71
Sweden 2.48 0.33 0.28 0.19 2.32
United Kingdom 2.48 0.56 1.47 1.32 2.70
Figure D.6: Persistence profiles of the effect of system-wide shock to the
cointegrating relations (Model I)
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